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Cohen: The Negligence-Opportunism Tradeoff in Contract Law

THE NEGLIGENCE-OPPORTUNISM
TRADEOFF IN CONTRACT LAW
George M. Cohen*
In this Article,' Professor Cohen discusses the relationship
between two traditions of contract analysis developed in the Law
and Economics literature: one which focuses on assigning the
"sunk" costs of contract breach to the "least cost avoider," and
one which would assign these costs to whichever of the contracting
parties most likely acted opportunistically. The Article begins with a
thorough description of these two analyticalstrands, and uses them
to critique the classic "efficient breach" scenario.
Professor Cohen posits a fault-based economic theory of contract analysis that combines the "least cost avoider" and "opportunism" analytical strands. He focuses his discussion on scenarios
where these two analytical strands suggest differing outcomes to the
question of which party to a contract ought to absorb the "sunk"
costs associated with its breach. He argues that these scenarios
present a tradeoff between deterring negligent and opportunistic
behavior in the marketplace: The Negligence-Opportunism Tradeoff.
This tradeoff is analogous to the classic tension between individual
freedom and society's interest in market regulation. Professor Cohen
resolves this tension by arguing that the law should place a presumptive priority on curbing potentially opportunistic behavior, at
the expense of permitting-or at least not preventing-potentially
negligent behavior. He argues that to give priority to deterring
negligence over deterring opportunism-which many Law and Economics scholars implicitly advocate-perversely rewards deceitful
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behavior while punishing often unobservant action, and cracks the
foundation of trust necessaryfor efficient contracting to occur.

INTRODUCTION

Over the past two decades, Law and Economics scholars have
developed two different analytical approaches to contract law without
examining the relationship between them: The first approach, based
on the idea of the "least-cost-avoider" developed in tort law, aims to
deter "negligent" contracting behavior by punishing a contracting
party who fails to take cost-justified precautions. The second approach
aims to deter "opportunistic" contracting behavior by punishing a
contracting party who affirmatively acts contrary to some contractual
expectation or social norm.' Typically, scholars focus on one approach or the other in their work. Rarely do scholars combine the
I

1. Professors Goetz and Scott first recognized a version of this dichotomy in 1983
when they wrote that Law and Economics scholarship in the contracts area "has developed
from two distinct and largely unrelated analytic traditions." Charles J. Goetz & Robert E.
Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA.
L. REV. 967, 968 n.5 (1983) [hereinafter Mitigation Principle]. They identified these traditions
as the "bargain model" and the "transaction cost" approaches. Bargain model theorists "have
constructed models of contracting behavior under conditions of low transaction costs to
examine the influence of different legal rules in environments where parties are able to
allocate all relevant risks at the time of contracting." Id. In contrast, transaction cost theorists
"have focused on methods of reducing transaction costs in complex contractual relationships.
They assume that uncertainty and complexity often prevent parties from accurately allocating
all relevant risks at the time of contracting. This scholarship thus examines the strategies
parties devise to encourage subsequent cooperation in such relational contracts." Id Other
scholars have recognized the dichotomy identified by Goetz and Scott. See Jay M. Feinman,
Contract After the Fall, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1537, 1539 n.11 (1987) (reviewing HUGH COLLINS, THE LAW OF CONTRACT (1986)); Jay M. Feinman, The Jurisprudence of Classification,
41 STAN. L. REV. 661, 670 n.35 (1989); Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract: What We Do
and Do Not Know, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 483, 495-96; see also Jason S. Johnston, Law,
Economics, and Post-Realist Explanation, 24 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 1217 (1990) (distinguishing
the "model of precautions" from "transaction cost economics").
If by "distinct and largely unrelated," Goetz and Scott meant that these traditions must
necessarily be so, this conclusion seems highly questionable. The distinctions between the
traditions that they identify are based on different assumptions about transaction costs and
court competence in the two approaches and different objects of study. The bargain model
assumes low transaction costs and focuses on court rules. The transaction costs model assumes high transaction costs and focuses on private contracting devices. But there is no
necessary connection between the assumptions in these models. In particular, models of the
influence of different legal rules under conditions of high transaction costs would seem to be
crucial to an economic analysis of contract law. In distinguishing between the two traditions,
I find more significant the type of behavior which the law seeks to deter or encourage, not
assumptions about transaction costs and relative institutional competence.
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two approaches. 2 Never have scholars combined them in any systematic way.
This paper will develop a general fault-based economic theory of
contract law that combines the least-cost-avoider and opportunism
approaches. In many cases, these approaches point toward the same
outcome, but often they conflict and present what I call the negligence-opportunism tradeoff: the legal rule must favor the deterrence
of one type of behavior over the other. The negligence-opportunism
tradeoff captures to a large degree the fundamental tension in contract
law largely ignored by economists but traditionally recognized by
lawyers: the tension between individual freedom of contract and social
regulation of the marketplace.3 In resolving this tradeoff, I argue on
efficiency grounds that the law should place a presumptive priority on
deterring potentially opportunistic behavior over deterring potentially
negligent behavior. To give priority to deterring negligence over deterring opportunism-which many economists often implicitly advocate-perversely rewards deceitful sleaziness while often punishing
hapless incompetence, and cracks the foundation of trust necessary for
2. Goetz and Scott, as well as other scholars, have started to link the two traditions.
See VICTOR P. GOLDBERG, READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW (1989); RICHARD A. POsNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (4th ed. 1992); Ian Ayres & Robert Gerlner,
Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J.
87 (1989); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis
of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261
(1985) [hereinafter Limits of Expanded Choice]; Mitigation Principle, supra note 1; cf. Robert
Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1982) [hereinafter Cost of Coase] (contrasting the "Coase Theorem" with the "Hobbes Theorem"). Professor Goldberg's book in
particular has greatly influenced my thinking about the problems discussed in this paper.
3. See, e.g., Robert Braucher, Freedom of Contract and the Second Restatement, 78
YALE LJ. 598, 599 (1969) (arguing that the Second Restatement "makes clearer the tension
that exists between the doctrines of freedom of contract and elemental fairness of the transaction"); Harry W. Jones, The Jurisprudence of Contracts, 44 U. CN. L. REV. 43, 54 (1975)
("conflicts . . . arise often and inevitably between freedom of contract as a political value
and social interest and, on the other side, the public interest in commercial fairness and
socially advantageous economic arrangements"); Friedrich Kessler, Contract as a Principle of
Order, in CONTRACTS 1-17 (Friedrich Kessler et al. eds., 3d ed. 1986); Roscoe Pound,
Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE LJ. 454, 482 (1909) (arguing that constitutional decisions
striking down social legislation as violative of freedom of contract are wrong because they
ignore the fact that "there never has been at common law any such freedom of contract as
they postulate. From the time that promises not under seal have been enforced at all, equity
has interfered with contracts in the interests of weak, necessitous, or unfortunate promisors").
For more recent revisions of the tension, see Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Responsive Model of
Contract Law, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1107 (1984) (identifying the "objective-subjective spectrum"
and the "standardized-individualized spectrum") and Joel Levin & Banks McDowell, The
Balance Theory of Contracts: Seeking Justice in Voluntary Obligations, 29 MCGILL L.J. 24
(1983) (developing a model that balances "voluntariness" and "fairness").
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efficient contracting behavior to occur.
My broader thesis is that focusing on this tradeoff leads to a
revision of traditional thinking about contract law. Traditional contract
law is organized from a litigator's perspective Was a valid contract
formed?; Was it breached?; Is there any excuse?; What remedies are
available? Doctrines have been carved out based on this schema: offer
and acceptance, consideration, conditions, mistake, impossibility, and
damages. But the traditional approach often blinds us to the underlying economic relationships and doctrinal similarities. An economic approach to contract can illuminate these relationships and similarities.
Courts and scholars should shift attention away from their obsession
with what kinds of promises the law should enforce. Instead, the
economic approach I advocate suggests that what matters more are
the parties' reasons for making and breaking their contracts. Formulating contract doctrine along these lines will lead us to create and
enforce contract law that is more efficient-and more just.4
I.

THE Two TRADITIONS OF EcoNOMIc
ANALYSIS OF CONTRACT LAW

A.

The Least-Cost-Avoider Tradition

One approach Law and Economics scholars have used to analyze
contract law focuses on deterring negligent contracting behavior by
advocating legal rules that encourage cost-effective precautions.5 This
approach is largely a transplant from the economic analysis of accident law,6 one of the common law areas first subjected to scrutiny
4. I do not intend to take a position here on the debate about whether justice and
efficiency are equivalent. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 2, at 27. To a large extent, the
debate may be a semantic one. My point here is that increasing emphasis on deterring
opportunism is consistent with both efficiency as traditionally defined by Law and Economics
scholars and justice as understood by more traditional scholars. That is, in this instance at
least the two goals need not conflict. See F.H. Buckley, Three Theories of Substantive
Fairness, 19 HoFSTRA L. REV. 33, 65-66 (1990) (noting that promoting fairness is often
efficient and that in such cases "greater fairness may be accompanied by greater wealth").
5. The best statement of this approach is Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and
Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 CAL L. REV. 1 (1985) [hereinafter Model of Pre.
caution]. Cooter defines a "precaution" broadly as "any action that reduces harm." Id. at 3.
Early examples of this approach include Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1978) and Richard A. Posner &
Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic
Analysis, 6 J.LEGAL STUD. 83 (1977).

6. "Accidents" in this tradition are defined as "harmful outcomes that neither injurers
nor victims wished to occur ..

STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT

LAW 1 (1987).
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by the new Law and Economics scholarship.7 The central theme of
these writings is that the law establishes default entitlement settings
that tend to put the burden of various risks on the party best able to
take actions to prevent, mitigate, or insure against these risks: the
least-cost-avoider.8 Current Law and Economics scholarship in the
contracts area continues to follow this tradition.9
The least-cost-avoider tradition is best understood by thinking
first about the paradigmatic tort situation from which it arose: a car
accident that injures a pedestrian."t The accident creates a sunk (irretrievable) loss, the risk of which the law must assign. Economic
analysts have defined legal rules as "efficient" if they create incentives for future parties similarly situated to minimize joint costs (or
equivalently to maximize joint wealth)." The parties can take various precautions to reduce the probability of the accident or the magnitude of the harm. Ex ante (before the accident), the parties can
purchase safety equipment, drive or walk more carefully, or substitute
other safer activities for driving or walking. 2 Risk averse parties can

7. See Guido Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of Costs, 78 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1965); Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk
Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961).
8. See GuImO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 135 (1970) [hereinafter COSTS OF
ACCIDENTS]. Later writings in the accident law area have recognized that often efficiency
requires providing incentives for both parties to take precautions, because one party's precautions would not eliminate the expected residual accident costs and the second party's precautions would further reduce these costs. In such a case, there is no one least-cost-avoider. See
SHAVELL, supra note 6, at 17-18. The least-cost-avoider approach has therefore come to be
viewed as a special case involving either "unilateral care," in which only one party can take
precautions, or "alternative care," in which precautions by both parties are merely duplicative.
See POSNER, supra note 2, at 170 (distinguishing alternative care cases from joint care cases).
But see Stephen G. Gilles, Negligence, Strict Liability, and the Cheapest Cost-Avoider, 78 Va.
L. Rev. 1271 (1992) (defending the least-cost-avoider concept in tort law analysis). Nevertheless, in contract law, this special case is significant for reasons discussed below. See infra
note 23. I will therefore preserve the "least-cost-avoider" terminology here, as other economic
scholars of contract have done. See, e.g., GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 51-73.
9. See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Symposium on Causation in the Law of Torts: Torts as the
Union of Liberty and Efficiency; An Essay on Causation, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 523, 532
(1987); Richard E. Speidel, Warranty Theory, Economic Loss, and the Privity Requirement:
Once More Into the Void, 67 B.U. L. REV. 9, 47 (1987); John T. Vangel, A ComplicityDoctrine Approach to Section 10(b) Aiding and Abetting Civil Damages Actions, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 180, 190 (1989).
10. See COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 8, at 148-49.
11. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 2 at 13-16. Minimizing joint costs and maximizing
joint wealth are equivalent if "costs" are defined to include opportunity costs, as well as the
direct costs of accidents and precautions.
12. This last form of precaution is often neglected under traditional negligence standards.
Economists term this omission and the distorted incentives it creates the "activity level
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insure and thus reduce the costs associated with uncertainty. Ex post
(after the accident), the parties may be able to mitigate losses by
acting quickly to seek medical help, for example. Efficient legal rules
minimize the sum of all precaution costs and the residual expected
accident costs.
In formulating efficient legal rules, economists usually start with
the simplest model and then add complexities. Coase posited the
simplest possible model, in which transaction costs are zero, and
concluded that in such a situation all legal rules are efficient because
future parties will bargain around costly legal default settings.' 3 In
the car accident example, however, transaction costs are great. Future
parties would not bargain before the accident to assign this risk because it would be impossible for the driver and the pedestrian before
the accident to identify each other and then get together and negotiate
some kind of mutually beneficial arrangement. Thus, an economicallyminded court can "mimic the market" by choosing default rules that
encourage both parties to take optimal precautions.
The least-cost-avoider approach is a rule of thumb for choosing
such efficient legal rules. Under this approach, the court must evaluate which party was in a better position to take the optimal precautions."4 The court then assigns the loss to this party to provide an
incentive for a similarly situated party to take those precautions in the
future. t5
Law and Economics scholars have transplanted this approach to
contract law. Instead of an "accident" we now have a "regret contingency"' 6 for which the contracting parties did not provide; that is,
the contract has a "gap."' 7 The contingency can be, for example, a

problem." See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 131-32

(2d ed. 1989).
13. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2-8 (1960).
14. See COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 8, at 155 (explaining that -the search for the
cheapest cost avoider of accident costs is the search for that activity which has most readily
available a substitute activity that is substantially safer"). Calabresi's analysis of finding the
least-cost-avoider is substantially more complex than this, but this notion captures the essence

of the theory.
15. Id at 73-75.
16. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the
Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1273 (1980) [hereinafter Enforcing Promises] (defining
regret contingency as the occurrence of a condition that would .motivate breach if breach

were a cost-less option to the promisor).
17. Economists sometimes postulate an ideal "complete contingent claims contract,"
which dictates what the parties agree to do in every possible situation. Under such a contract,
which is one of the great "assumed can openers" of Law and Economics, there is no need to
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change in market price, the appearance of an unforeseen opportunity,
a mistake, or a fire.' 8 Again, both parties can take various precautions: the promisor can provide backup performance or monitor its
actions more carefully; the promisee can temper its reliance; both
parties can insure, 9 condition the promise, mitigate, or contract
less.2" Finally, as in the car accident case, the court may assign the
loss associated with this contingency efficiently by asking which party
could have best prevented or reduced the loss by taking cost-effective
precautions. 2 From this perspective, economic scholars have identified an essential economic unity between torts and contracts.22

worry about regret contingencies.
18. See, e.g., Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919 (Mich. 1887) (parties contracted for
the purchase and sale of a cow believed to be unable to breed. When the seller discovered
that the cow was with calf he attempted to void the contract based on the legal doctrine of
mistake); Taylor v. Caldwell, 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (K.B. 1863) (Taylor contracted to use
Caldwell's music hall for a series of performances when one week prior to the first performance the Hall was destroyed by fire); U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 4 (1990) ("But a severe shortage of raw materials or of supplies due to a contingency such as war, embargo, local crop
failure, unforeseen shutdown of major sources of supply or the like, which . . . causes a
marked increase in cost . . . is within the contemplation of this section.").
19. Posner and Rosenfield use the term "superior risk bearer" to capture the notion that
insurance, as well as preventive action, is a precaution. See Posner & Rosenfield, supra note
5, at 90.
20. Though some scholars seem to think that we never want to deter promise-making,
see, e.g., W. David Slawson, The Role of Reliance in Contract Damages, 76 CORNELL L.
REV. 197, 218 (1990) ("As a rule, promising is not wrongful conduct. We do not want to
deter promising."), one way to interpret many contract doctrines is that they are designed to
deter (or at least reduce) promise-making. Some doctrines deter promise-making by denying
enforcement. These include the doctrines of illegality, fraud, duress, unconscionability, and
capacity. See, e.g., Buckley, supra note 4, at 50 ("Where bargains are vitiated by fraud,
duress or incapacity, the level of contracting is assumed to be excessive."). Less obviously,
perhaps, other doctrines deter promise-making by granting enforcement. These include the
objective theory of contracts (deters joke and other unintended promises), promissory estoppel
and the material benefit rule (deters-perhaps unintentionally-certain gratuitous promises), and
the doctrine of unilateral mistake (deters accidental promises). The use of contract enforcement to deter or reduce promise-making is analogous to the use of strict liability in torts to
deter or reduce "ultrahazardous" activities. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCURE OF TORT LAW 111-20 (1987).
21. Goetz and Scott refer to this idea as allocating risks to the party who has the
"comparative advantage in risk-bearing." Mitigation Principle, supra note 1, at 971 n.l1. For
an example of an application of this approach, see Enforcing Promises, supra note 16, at
1305-09 (advocating enforcement of nonreciprocal promises if extralegal sanctions are not
effective to induce optimal precautions by promisors and if performance is relatively certain).
22. See Model of Precaution, supra note 5. Cooter's point is somewhat different than
the focus of this paper. He argues that in joint care cases, the law must solve what he calls
the "paradox of compensation." Id. at 2-5. The paradox is that for both parties to have
incentives to take optimal precautions, they must both bear the full cost of harm at the
margin, but strict liability and no liability rules both provide insufficient incentives for one
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But in their zealous quest for unity, which is one of the hallmarks and prime benefits of Law and Economics, economic scholars
have failed to emphasize key differences between tort accidents and
contract breaches. This makes exclusive reliance on the least-costavoider concept more misleading in contract cases than in unintentional tort cases.23 What these differences all have in common is the
danger of opportunistic behavior.
Unlike accident law, contract law must somehow take account of
the consensual interaction of two parties-the contract. In the leastcost-avoider tradition, a contract is more than an agreement on specified terms; it is another form of precaution. Contract law provides a
set of "defaults," which the parties can override in their contract.2 4
party to take precautions. Id. at 3-4. According to Cooter, the tort law solution to the
paradox is to use fault rules rather than strict liability; the contract law solution is to impose
strict liability for breaches, but to make damages invariant to the promisee's reliance. Id. at
5-19.
I disagree with Cooter's assertion that fault rules are not important in contract law.
See id. at 31-32. For example, courts do look at the reasonableness of the promisee's reliance
in deciding whether to enforce promises in the absence of consideration. See, e.g., Quake
Constr. v. American Airlines, 565 N.E.2d 990, 1004 (Ill. 1990); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. b (1981) (stating that the reasonableness of the promisee's reliance
bears on the requirement that relied-upon promises should be enforced only if enforcement
avoids injustice). Fault rules are also important in contract excuse doctrines, such as mistake.
But I agree with Cooter's general point that the paradox exists and that the law addresses it
in several different ways. See Model of Precaution, supra note 5.
23. The least-cost-avoider concept is, in one important sense, more helpful in contract
law than in tort law. One can distinguish two types of precautions: those that reduce the
probability of a regret contingency, and those that reduce the magnitude of harm that occurs.
In tort accidents, as noted above, application of the least-cost-avoider concept is problematic
because both parties must be given incentives to take precautions often that reduce the
probability of harm. See supra notes 5-14 and accompanying text. Contract contingencies, on
the other hand, often require that only one party take each type of precaution. Contract regret
contingencies are often not events whose probability the parties can cheaply control by taking
ex ante precautions. The best example is a change in market price. But those contingencies
that the parties can control by taking precautions are often either problems of alternative care,
such as "mistakes," or problems of unilateral precaution, such as unsatisfactory performance
or delay. Precautions against excessive damages-tempered reliance ex ante and mitigation ex
post-also typically involve either alternative care or unilateral precaution. Although the
"least-cost-avoider" (the party best able to take probability-reducing precautions) may not be
the same party as the "least-cost-mitigator" (the party best able to take loss-reducing precautions), within each category of precaution the use of the least-cost-avoider label makes sense.
Moreover, as Cooter notes, courts can provide incentives for both parties by using the leastcost-avoider determination to manipulate liability rules and the least-cost-mitigator determination to manipulate damage rules. See Model of Precaution, supra note 5, at 32 & r70. It is
no wonder then, that contract scholars continue to use the term though it has fallen into
disfavor in the tort area.
24. See generally Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2 (discussing the concept of default);
Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MIcH.
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Failure to override the relevant default where it is relatively cheap to
do so can be viewed as an inefficient failure to take "contract-based
precautions.94
To take one example that has recently received much attention in
the Law and Economics literature, 26 if the default rule states that
foreseeable consequential damages are recoverable, the promisor can
put in a clause that excludes consequential damages. On the other
hand, if the default rule does not allow consequential damages unless
specifically contracted for, the promisee can contract for them and put
in a clause to that effect. If the default is known,2 7 then the party
who suffers a loss under that default and fails to take contract-based
precautions to protect itself can be deemed the least-cost-avoider.28
But the least-cost-avoider analysis is not so simple. In many
contract disputes the question is what the default should be. If transaction costs are low, 29 then the Coase Theorem suggests that from
an efficiency perspective, the default rule chosen does not matter
unless either party has a comparative advantage in taking contractbased precautions. 3° Absent such a comparative advantage, the low

L. REV. 489 (1989) (same); Limits of Expanded Choice, supra note 2 (same).
25. Goetz and Scott refer to the conditioning of promises in this way as taking "quality
precautions," which they differentiate from taking "quantity precautions," or making fewer
promises. Enforcing Promises, supra note 16, at 1274. Because the term "quality precautions"
does not capture the fact that these precautions cannot be taken in typical tort cases (excluding product liability), I prefer the term in the text.
1 26. See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2, at 101-04; Lucian A. Bebchuk & Steven
Shavell, Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The Rule of Hadley
v. Baxendale, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 284 (1991); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Principle of
Hadley v. Baxendale, 80 CAL. L. REV. 563 (1992); Richard A. Epstein, Beyond Foreseeability: Consequential Damages in the Law of Contract, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 105 (1989); Jason S.
Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100
YALE LJ. 615 (1990).
27. The prevailing default, of course, is Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep.
145 (1854).
28. Courts have often used this type of argument to support the results they reach. See,
e.g., Stees v. Leonard, 20 Minn. 448, 451 (1874) (holding a builder to its contract despite
unforeseen soil difficulties on the ground that "the hardship is attributable, not to the law,
but to the contractor himself, who has improvidently assumed an absolute, when he might
have undertaken only a qualified liability"). If, however, the probability of a particular
contingency is very low, it might not be cost-effective for either party to draft an appropriate
clause. See POSNER, supra note 2, at 92-93.
29. Economic scholars tend to think of transaction costs in the contract context, unlike
the tort accident context, as being low because the parties are already in a bargaining relationship.
30. In certain situations one party may in fact have a comparative advantage in taking
contract-based precautions. For example, a repeat contractor with an in-house legal staff might
have lower precaution costs than a one-shot, individual contractor.
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transaction cost scenario seems to render irrelevant the traditional
least-cost-avoider function of setting defaults.3 t Economic scholars
have recognized, however, that there are transaction costs involved in
contracting around a default setting. Therefore, they have argued that
efficiency-minded courts should set the default in accordance with the
preferences of a majority of contracting parties.32
This majoritarian approach to default setting resurrects the idea
of placing risk on the least-cost-avoider, in the sense of the party in a
better position to take precautions itself. But it also contemplates
placing risk on "idiosyncratic" parties, who have private information
about their unusual circumstances. These parties are also deemed
least-cost-avoiders, not necessarily because they can reduce or insure
against risk themselves, but because they can take contract-based
precautions; that is, they can reveal their private information to the
other party so that the other party will be able to take precautions or
insure optimally. The least-cost-avoider tradition has generally assumed that contract-based precautions are no different than other
precautions.
But two important recent articles by Professor Johnston and
Professors Ayres and Gertner recognize that contract-based precautions
are meaningfully different from other precautions, though they reach
different conclusions about how defaults should be set.33 Both articles rely on the insight that when precautions depend on information
revelation, courts must take into account the fact that parties may not
truthfully reveal all relevant information for strategic reasons.' Put

31. Professor Levmore has argued for similar reasons that the least-cost-avoider approach
is not so helpful in analyzing the law of restitution. See Saul Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 VA. L. REV. 65, 72-74 (1985). In my view, Levmore is overly skeptical about the
usefulness of the least-cost-avoider approach in this area because he ignores the possibility of
deeming as least-cost-avoider the party with the "last clear chance" to avoid the problem.
However, his general conclusion that the least-cost-avoider approach alone is not sufficient to
explain restitution law is consistent with the thesis of this article.
32. See, e.g., Mitigation Principle, supra note 1, at 971. Johnston calls this idea the
Coasean Contractual Theory. See Johnston, supra note 26, at 623-26. Ayres and Gertner refer
to the majoritarian rule as an "untailored default," which they distinguish from a "tailored
default," or one that is based on the preferences of the parties to a particular contract. Ayres
& Gertner, supra note 2, at 91. It seems to me that what differentiates a tailored default
from an untailored default is not that the untailored default is a majoritarian rule and the
tailored default is not, but simply that an untailored default takes into account fewer circumstances. That is, it is more like a "rule" than a "standard," to use the more familiar jargon.
33. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2, at 91, 97-100; Johnston, supra note 26, at 61619.
34. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2, at 94; Johnston, supra note 26, at 616-17.
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another way, the failure to take contract-based precautions, unlike the
failure to take many precautions against accidents, may not be an act
we would normally call "negligent," but an act we would normally
call "intentional." Whatever implications this fact has for the analysis,3s it at least casts doubt on the straightforward application of the
least-cost-avoider concept to contract-based precautions. 6
A second, related way that the existence of the contract complicates the least-cost-avoider analysis involves not the setting of the
default, but the determination of whether the parties have overridden
the default.37 The problem is that it is not always so certain whether
the parties have agreed and to what they have agreed. Ironically then,
contracts not only decrease, but also increase transaction costs, because a party to whom the contract assigned a particular risk may
later deny that obligation. 38 One could simply apply the least-costavoider approach and argue that we should encourage the party in the
best position to clarify and specify the agreement to do so, and to
some extent the law does this.39 But this solution ignores the possi-

35. Ayres and Gertner argue that if contract-based precautions are more important than
other precautions, we might want courts to choose not majoritarian defaults, but rather
"penalty defaults," which are deliberately set at what the parties would not want in order to
encourage information disclosure. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2, at 91, 97-100; see also
Johnston, supra note 26, at 620-23 (referring to this approach as the "information-forcing
paradigm"). They use this idea to argue in favor of a restrictive interpretation of the Hadley
rule to force high value shippers to reveal (rather than strategically withhold) their private
information to carriers. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2, at 101-04.
Johnston argues in favor of a broad reading of the Hadley rule, which he claims the
courts have in fact adopted on the ground that given strategic incentives, high value shippers
would be less likely to contract around a narrow default than low value shippers would be to
contract around an expansive default. In particular, under a narrow default, high value shippers would be reluctant to reveal their value because they would then be subject to a higher
price. Moreover, carriers would be reluctant to reveal the likelihood of nonperformance for
fear of losing the contract or being forced to lower their price. See Johnston, supra note 26,
at 616-17.
36. Johnston in fact differentiates "precautions" from "revealing information" and chides
Judge Posner's discussion of Hadley, see POSNER, supra note 2, at 126-28, for a "nifty bit of
rhetoric" in lumping the two together under the "avoidability principle because this label
suggests the only case in which the principle is clearly efficient." See Johnston, supra note
26, at 621 n.23. I think Posner's argument may be based more on his overly broad interpretation of the least-cost-avoider paradigm (the avoidability principle) than on strategic rhetoric.
But I agree with Johnston's bigger point, which is that the prospect of strategic behavior
makes information revelation different from other precautions.
37. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2, at 119-27.
38. See Mitigation Principle, supra note 1, at 977-84.
39. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1981) (directing courts to
interpret writings against the drafter). Ayres and Gertner refer to this rule as another example
of a penalty default. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2, at 105 n.80.
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bility-discussed below-that acting according to the parties' mutual
understanding of the agreement could also be viewed as a "precaution. , 40
The problem is exacerbated by the fact that in contracts, many
precautions occur ex post.4' The least-cost-avoider approach assumes
there is no special problem posed by sequential decision making. This
approach makes some sense in tort cases because there is usually
only one relevant time for precaution-taking decisions by both parties:
before the accident. Ex post mitigation is often limited to seeking
medical attention, though sometimes decision making by the relevant
parties may be sequential, as in "last clear chance" cases. 42 In contract cases, by contrast, ex post mitigation and sometimes even complete avoidance of the loss are often possible.43 Moreover, there may
not be any "real" loss at all. Law and Economics scholars analyzing
contract remedies have often focused solely on the ex post incentives
of the party contemplating breach and ignored or downplayed ex ante
precautions." But the problems of information withholding and obligation denial are particularly acute ex post. Therefore, ex post precautions may be meaningfully different from ex ante precautions in a
way not captured by the least-cost-avoider approach.
These problems-withholding information in negotiations, denying contractual obligations, and claiming nonexistent losses-all point
to a significant type of behavior not present in the paradigmatic tort
case: the problem of opportunism. Because of the potential for opportunistic behavior, the least-cost-avoider approach provides an incomplete explanation of and justification for contract doctrine.

40. See infra notes 128-34 and accompanying text.
41. Note that in contract cases, "ex ante" could refer either to the time before the
contract is entered into or the time before the regret contingency arises. I will adopt the
latter meaning, which coincides with the common-sense distinction between (ex ante) precaution and (ex post) mitigation, and captures the idea that a regret contingency can occur
before a formal contract is entered into.
42. See generally Donald Wittman, Optimal Pricing of Sequential Inputs: Last Clear
Chance, Mitigation of Damages, and Related Doctrines in the Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 65
(1981) (arguing that marginal cost liability is the "optimal method" of pricing sequential
inputs because efficient choices are dictated by the internalization of all costs).
43. See Mitigation Principle, supra note 1, at 1005-11.
44. See Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient
Breach, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 630, 646-50 (1988) (noting that the theory of efficient breach
focuses primarily on the question of the least cost ex post mitigator of the loss resulting
from breach).
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B.

The Opportunism Tradition

Beginning in the mid-1970s, but predominantly during the 1980s,
a second economic approach to contract law began to develop. This
approach has traveled under several different names-relational contracting, transaction cost theory, new institutional economics-and has
not been propounded solely by writers sympathetic to economics (at
least Chicago-style economics). The approach is also less unified than
the least-cost-avoider tradition. In my opinion, however, the distinguishing feature common to all variants of this approach and the
feature that highlights the difference between this approach and the
least-cost-avoider approach is the focus on the need to deter opportunistic, as opposed to negligent, contracting behavior4 5
As they do with the least-cost-avoider concept, Law and Economics scholars generally use a paradigmatic case to describe opportunism. Consider a contract to build a house. If construction precedes
payment, then before payment but after full or partial construction,
the buyer can force the builder to renegotiate the price or other term
by threatening to withhold payment even though no other circumstances change. Such behavior by the buyer is deemed opportunis6
tic.

4

Economists agree more on examples of opportunistic behavior
than on definitions of it, though the term has achieved general acceptance.47 Posner and Goldberg, for example, define opportunistic be45. Professor Cooter has termed the "Hobbes Theorem" the view that the "role of law
is to minimize the inefficiency that results when bargaining fails, by restricting the threats
which the parties can make against each other." Cost of Coase, supra note 2, at 18-19. This
is similar to what I term the opportunism tradition, though Cooter seems to limit the application of the Hobbes Theorem to blatant forms of coercion.
46. See POSNER, supra note 2, at 89; Victor P. Goldberg, Relational Exchange: Economics and Complex Contracts, in GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 17.
47. Judge Posner did not use the term in the second edition of his treatise. By the time
he wrote the third edition, the deterrence of opportunism had become "the fundamental function of contract law (and recognized as such at least since Hobbes's day)." RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYsIs OF LAW 81 (3d ed. 1986); see also Wisconsin Knife Works v.
National Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1285 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.) (holding that
because the performance of the parties to a contract is typically not simultaneous, one party
may find himself at the mercy of the other unless the law of contracts protects him. Indeed
the most important thing which that law does is to facilitate exchanges that are not simultaneous by preventing either party from taking advantage of the vulnerabilities to which sequential performance may give rise.). Recent treatises on contracts do not make use of the
term. See JOHN D. CALAMAU & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CoNTRACTs (3d ed. 1987); E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTs (2d ed. 1990); JOHN E. MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS (3d
ed. 1990). But some non-economic scholars have begun to incorporate the term into their
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havior
simply as taking advantage of the other party's vulnerability.4 Williamson's well-known definition evokes conventional morality: opportunism is "self interest seeking with guile.' 49 Others, notably Goetz and Scott, and Muris, connect opportunism to the parties'
agreement by defining it as an attempted redistribution of an already
allocated contractual pie."
Each of these definitions captures part, but only part, of the
types of behavior economists generally characterize as opportunistic,
and thereby limits unnecessarily the application of the concept. The
Posner and Goldberg definition focuses on the conditions under which
opportunism is likely to occur. Contracting parties are "vulnerable" in
two senses. First, they cannot foresee all possible problems that can
arise, and therefore cannot write complete contingent claims contracts;
that is, they are subject to bounded rationality.51 Bounded rationality

work See, e.g., MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 28 (1988);
Randy E. Barnett & Mary E. Becker, Beyond Reliance: Promissory Estoppe4 Contract
Formalities, and Misrepresentations, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 443, 461 n.88, 468 n.125 (1987);
Clayton P. Gillette, Commercial Rationality and the Duty to Adjust Long-Term Contracts, 69
MINN. L. REV. 521, 554 & n.107, 556, 562 (1985); Robert A. Hillman, Contract Modification and 'Self-Help Specific Performance: A Response to Professor Narasimhan, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 62 (1989); Richard E. Speidel, The New Spirit of Contract, 2 J.L. & COM.
193, 204 (1982). The term is not without its critics. See Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient
Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3-4 (1989).
48. GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 17; POSNER, supra note 2, at 89 & 117.
49. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 47 (1985)
[hereinafter ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS]. Williamson has repeated this definition for many years.
See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 26 (1975); Oliver E. Williamson et al., Understanding the Employment Relation: The
Analysis of Idiosyncratic Exchange, 6 BELL J. ECON. 250, 258-59 (1975). Williamson intends
to distinguish opportunistic behavior from the kind of self-interested behavior usually assumed
in economics. He is fond of citing a quotation from economist Peter Diamond that "standard
economic models treat 'individuals as playing a game with fixed rules which they obey. They
do not buy more than they can pay for, they do not embezzle funds, they do not rob
banks.'" ECONOMIC INSTITtIMONS, supra, at 49 n.7, 65 (citing Peter Diamond, Political and
Economic Evaluation of Social Effects and Externalities: Comment, in FRONTIERS OF QUANTITATIVE ECONOMICS 31 (Michael D. Intriligator ed., 1971)). The normative principle embedded
in this distinction is that we do not want people to engage in individualistic cost-benefit
calculations with respect to every decision they make.
50. Charles 3. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L.
REV. 1089, 1139 n.118 (1981) [hereinafter Relational Contracts]; Timothy J. Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REV. 521, 521 (1981). Muris's
precise definition is that opportunism occurs "when a performing party behaves contrary to
the other party's understanding of their contract, but not necessarily contrary to the
agreement's explicit terms, leading to a transfer of wealth from the other party to the performer." Ud. (emphasis added). It is not clear why the performing party's action would be
opportunistic unless it was contrary to the shared understanding of the contract.
51. See ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 49, at 45.
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makes one party vulnerable not only to unanticipated future events,
but also to unanticipated opportunistic behavior by the other party.52
Second, contracting parties perform their contractual obligations
sequentially rather than simultaneously. Many of the investments they
make in the contract are "sunk," or nonrecoverable investments that
have few or significantly inferior alternative uses. 53 When a contracting party makes sunk investments in transaction-specific assets, that
party is at the mercy of the other party because the vulnerable party
has nowhere else to turn. Even if before committing itself the investing party had many contracting options available, the sunk investments effect a "fundamental transformation '' 54 from a "thick" or
competitive market ex ante to a "thin" market or bilateral monopoly
ex post.55 Sunk investments make opportunism more profitable, and
therefore more likely.
The Posner-Goldberg definition misses several important features
of conduct generally recognized as opportunism, however. It describes
one form of opportunism-"ex post" opportunism-but ignores "ex
ante" opportunism, which includes fraud and adverse selection.56 An
opportunistic party may intend to mislead or deceive the other party
from the beginning of the relationship, before the other party has
invested in it. Thus, the "fundamental transformation" resulting from
sunk investments in transaction-specific assets, though facilitative of

52. Williamson refers to uncertainty created by potential opportunism as "behavioral
uncertainty," and argues that such uncertainty is pervasive because "[tihe capacity for novelty
in the human [especially legal!] mind is rich beyond imagination." Id at 58. But cf. HAROLD
C. HAvGHURST, THE NATURE OF PRIVATE CoNTRACT 70 (1961) (stating that "furtive breach
of a promise is seldom possible"). Despite Professor Havighurst's initial skepticism, he later
argues that "an evil contract breaker can frequently hide behind a trumped-up defense," idL at
75, and that "[firaudulent lawsuits are common." Il at 115.
53. ECONOMIC INSTrTUTONS, supra note 49, at 53-56. Williamson calls this condition
.asset specificity." Williamson's precise definition is that "asset specificity refers to durable
investments that are undertaken in support of particular transactions, the opportunity cost of
which investments is much lower in best alternative uses or by alternative users should the
original transaction be prematurely terminated .... " Ia at 55.
54. Id at 61-63.
55. See David D. Haddock et al., An Ordinary Economic Rationale for Extraordinary
Legal Sanctions, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1, 14 n.40 (1990) (defining "thick" and "thin" markets).
56. See ECONOMIC INSTITuTIONs, supra note 49, at 47-48. Not all economists view
adverse selection as a problem of opportunism; many view it simply as a problem of asymmetric information. But I agree with Williamson that absent opportunism, contracting parties
could simply solve the problem of adverse selection by requiring honest disclosure. Id at 48.
In fact, the literature on default rules and strategic information disclosure, see supra notes 3435 and accompanying text, is simply an application of the adverse selection problem; see
also infra notes 116-18 and accompanying text (discussing opportunism and moral hazard).
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opportunism, is not necessary for it. Including ex ante fraud and ex
post bad faith under the same umbrella term, opportunism also highlights the behavioral similarities of the temporally distinct conduct.'
In addition, the "taking advantage of the other party's vulnerability" definition is unclear about what "taking advantage" means. It
may mean only blatant behavior-behavior with no plausible justification-such as the house buyer's forcing the vulnerable builder to
modify its terms after construction, but before payment, for no reason
other than to get more money. 8 But focusing on this type of extortionate behavior obscures the fact that opportunism is often more
subtle, that is, difficult to detect or easily masked as legitimate conduct.59 The buyer often does not simply decide to become evil and
take advantage of the builder. There is usually some "regret contingency, '60 such as finding another builder who will build a better
house for less or a change in market price. An opportunistic party
can exaggerate or misrepresent the extent of the contingency, especially when that party has an asymmetric information advantage with
respect to that contingency.61 Moreover, there may be some clause
in the contract or rule of contract law that allows the buyer to escape
the contract, even though that clause or rule was intended to handle a
different situation.62 In summary, the Posner-Goldberg definition fo-

57. One need not accept that ex ante and ex post opportunism are equivalent (one could
view ex ante opportunism as more reprehensible) to agree that the two types of opportunism
share important features and that failure to recognize these similarities could lead to an
unwarranted underemphasis on deterring opportunism relative to determining negligence.
58. Posner at times seems to limit opportunism to cases in which no plausible economic
justification is offered by the promisor. See POSNER, supra note 2, at 97-98 (contrasting
Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902) with Goebel v. Linn, 11
N.W. 284 (Mich. 1882)); let at 117 ("A pays B in advance for goods and instead of delivering them B uses the money in another venture.").
59. See Muris, supra note 50, at 525; POSNER, supra note 2, at 91 ("But it is not
always obvious when a party is behaving opportunistically."). Williamson also distinguishes
"blatant opportunism," which includes lying, cheating, and stealing, from "subtle opportunism,"
which includes "the incomplete or distorted disclosure of information, especially . . . calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, or otherwise confuse." ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 49, at 47.

60. See supra note 16.
61. See iU at 80; Limits of Expanded Choice, supra note 2, at 311 ("Even if an
agreement were perfectly communicative between the parties initially, one of the parties may
dispute its meaning as a strategic response to a now disfavored arrangement.") (emphasis
added).
62. In Williamson's words, there may be "opportunistic efforts to take advantage of
(rely on) the letter of the contract when the spirit of the exchange is emasculated." ECoNOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 49, at 62.

Posner gives the example of a contract in which A hires B to paint his portrait "to
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cuses too much on blatant and ex post opportunism and too little on
subtle and ex ante opportunism.
The other two definitions of opportunism, posited by Goetz and
Scott, Muris, and Williamson, include subtle opportunism but differ
on the source of the standard against which contractual behavior is
measured.63 Both definitions view opportunism as inefficient in the
sense that ex ante, both parties would presumably agree not to allow
it; that is, opportunistic behavior is not joint maximizing.' But the
Goetz and Scott, and Muds definitions hypothesize that the parties
would agree not to allow opportunism because the behavior is contrary to the purposes of the agreement, which again excludes ex ante
opportunism. On the other hand, the Williamson definition hypothesizes that the parties would agree not to allow opportunism because it
violates moral standards, or in economic terms is not long-term maximizing behavior. 6 5 Behavior that violates contractual understandings
and behavior that violates societal norms would both seem to be
opportunistic. I therefore offer an alternatively broad definition of
opportunism: any contractual conduct by one party contrary to the
other party's reasonable expectations based on the parties' agreement,
contractual norms,' or conventional morality.'

A's satisfaction." He argues that if B paints a portrait that others admire but A rejects
without giving "any reason," then A acts in bad faith, that is, opportunistically. On the other
hand, if A is in fact dissatisfied with the portrait, but the dissatisfaction is "unreasonable" in
the eyes of others, then A has not acted opportunistically. See PosNER, supra note 2, at
91-92. Posner does not say how he would characterize a case in which A is in fact satisfied
with the quality of the portrait but claims he is dissatisfied with some other aspect of B's
performance because A wants to get out of the contract for other reasons. In my view, this
is a case of subtle opportunism in which A relies on the "letter" of the contract, which does
not expressly limit A's dissatisfaction to the quality of the portrait, yet violates the "spirit" of
the contract and thereby "takes advantage" of B's vulnerability. It may be difficult to tell that
this is what A is doing and we might hesitate to punish A because of this difficulty, but
that is different from saying that A is not acting opportunistically.
63. See generally Muris, supra note 50, at 532-34.
64. Posner would agree. See POSNER, supra note 2, at 91 (stating that it is "reasonable
to assume that if the parties had thought about the possibility of bad faith they would have
forbidden it expressly").
65. See ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 49, at 45-57.
66. I have in mind here such standards of behavior as U.C.C. § 1-205(2) (1990) (trade
usage); id § 1-205(1) (course of dealing); id. § 2-208 (course of performance); as well as
negotiating conventions, idi § 3-104(1) (defining negotiable instrument).
67. In using the term "conventional morality," I hope to, in the words of James Boyd
White, "keep alive the recognition that not everything can be said in economic terms, that
there are other languages, other cultures, with which it must have a relation, and to which it
should on many occasions submit." James B. White, Economics and Law: Two Cultures in
Tension, 54 TENN. L. REV. 161, 198 (1986). By conventional morality, I mean principles to
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My purpose in adopting such a broad definition is not merely to
quibble with the definitions others have advanced, but to argue that
opportunism does and should play a much broader role in understanding and developing contract doctrine from an economic perspective
than the legal economists have so far recognized. While Law and
Economics scholars have boldly applied the least-cost-avoider concept
to analyze and critique contract doctrine, they have been far more
timid in their claims for the role of contract doctrine in deterring
opportunism.
First, though it may seem self-evident to lawyers that legal rules
can be used to deter opportunistic behavior, and though some Law
and Economics scholars have taken this view, 8 Williamson and other sympathizers of the "transaction cost" school have their doubts.6 9
Williamson in particular rejects the "legal centralism tradition," which
assumes that "efficacious rules of law regarding contract disputes are
in place and are applied by the courts in an informed, sophisticated,
and low-cost way."7 Although Williamson understands that "court
ordering" is an important governing institution,71 and although his

which we are strongly committed-however much we may violate them or be tempted to
violate them in practice. These principles include prohibitions on lying, stealing, and cheating.
Of course, contract law incorporates these principles through its obligation of good faith. See
U.C.C. § 1-203 (1990); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981). But "good
faith" carries much doctrinal baggage which limits its general application. The term also
lumps together negligence and opportunism concerns. See U.C.C. § 2-103(l)(b) (1990) (defiming good faith for merchants as "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade").
Morality has not escaped the attention of economists. See, e.g., KENNETH J.ARRow,
THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 26-27 (1974). In fact, the famous "Prisoners* Dilemma" from
game theory can be used to explain the economic rationale for developing moral principles.
In this sense, opportunism can be viewed as a form of "noncooperative" behavior resulting
from excessive pursuit of self-interest. See AMARTYA SEN, CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEAsuREMENT 62-64, 66-68 (1982).
68. See Muris, supra note 50, at 522; see also Ayres & Gertner, stipra note 2, at 94
("By changing the default rules of the game, lawmakers can importantly reduce the opportunities for this rent-seeking, strategic behavior.").
69. See Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and the State of Nature, I J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 5, 29 (1985) (noting the limits of legal, as opposed to private, mechanisms for deterring opportunism and suggesting that "where the marginal cost of increasing transactional
security by strengthening the parties' legal remedies exceeds the marginal benefit of doing so,
the law will leave the task of further enhancing their security to the parties themselves").
70. ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 49, at 20. The term "legal centralism" comes
from Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law,
19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1, 1 (1981).
71. Williamson recognizes, for example, that private ordering always operates in the
"shadow of the law." ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 49, at 168 & n.4. The phrase
comes from Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
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main concern is examining private institutions that combat opportunism, to the extent he is suggesting that severe ineffectiveness of court
ordering is inherent in courts, I disagree.
Contracting parties cannot solve all problems of opportunism on
their own; thus, legal rules matter.72 Courts concerned with promoting efficiency can become more effective by incorporating explicitly
the goal of deterring opportunism into contract doctrine. Although
opportuiistic behavior may be difficult to detect-it is often difficult
for courts to discern what the reasonable contractual expectations of
the parties are-as courts incorporate opportunism concerns into contract doctrine, they will elicit more relevant facts and become better
able to detect opportunism. Furthermore, even imperfectly informed
courts can identify types of behavior that are potentially opportunistic
as well as situations in which opportunism is more likely to occur.
These courts can develop rebuttable presumptions of opportunistic
behavior.73 Thus, courts can become more informed, sophisticated,
and efficient in deterring opportunism.7
A second way that Law and Economics scholars limit the role of
contract doctrine in deterring opportunism is by tending to view the
problem of opportunistic behavior as present only in certain classes of
contracts, namely long-term or other "relational" contracts.75 But the
danger of opportunism lurks in many adjudicated contracts cases. It is
true that if perfect substitute markets are available, opportunism does
not pose much of a problem, but these cases are typically not litigat-

The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979), but the idea is not new. See HAViGHURST,
supra note 52 at 10 (Mhe reliability of direct observation is limited by the consideration
that when the public force does in truth lurk in the background, it is hard to tell the extent
to which it is having an effect upon the contracting parties."). Moreover, in his concluding
chapter, Willlamson acknowledges that "ifprivate ordering and court ordering can be used in
combination rather than separately, then the study of contract will benefit from an effort to
identify the mix of private and public structures that best serve the purposes of the parties."
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 49, at 399.
72. See Muris, supra note 50, at 527-28. In the language of traditional Law and Economies, the transaction costs of contracting around legal default settings are high. See Ayres
& Gertner, supra note 2, at 89, 92-93, 111.
73. See Muris, supra note 50, at 530. In fact, all legal rules contain factual presumptions and behavioral hypotheses. One could even describe common law adjudication as the
process of revising such presumptions and hypotheses in light" of experience and evolving
social norms.
74. I develop this point further below. See infra notes 173-86 and accompanying text.
75. Goetz and Scott sometimes seem to suggest this limitation, as does Goldberg. See
GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 16-17. But see id. at 1. My position is closer to that of
Macneil, who finds relational concerns in most contracts. See Ian R. Macneil, The Many
Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL L. REV. 691 (1974).
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ed.7" I do not dispute that long-term contracts are unique in certain
respects;' in particular, I do not mean to argue that the legal rules
governing long-term contracts should be the same as those governing
other types of contracts. Rather, my point is merely that many of the
insights into opportunistic behavior first gained in studying these
contracts could just as easily be applied to all contracts.
A third limitation that some scholars tend to put on using contract doctrine to deter opportunism is the tendency to confine concern
with opportunism to so-called "performance" or "enforcement" ques' Limiting
tions, but not to "formation."78
the study of opportunism to
performance cases results from defining opportunism in terms of the
agreement; if there is no agreement, there can be no behavior contrary to the other party's understanding of the agreement. But this
understanding of formation issues is somewhat naive. In many formation cases, there is an agreement, at least in the common sense understanding of the term, and the question is whether the court will ignore the agreement because some formation rule was not satisfied.79

76. See GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at I (stating that "most of the interesting, and difficult, questions of contract law disappear in a world of discrete transactions"). As Professors
Levin and McDowell eloquently put it:
When alternate goods or services are easily available on a ready market, the
disincentives to bring suit are great. It is when the market is not working, or
when agreement is questionable or the contract price is of disputed value, that suit
is brought. The law is concerned with unusual situations, those arising when things
have gone wrong. Theories based on models of institutional strength are of little
help when the institution relied upon is crumbling.
Levin & McDowell, supra note 3, at 58. In light of this statement, the aphorism "hard cases
make bad law," see, e.g., United States v. Clark, 96 U.S. 37, 49 (1878) (Harlan, J., dissenting), makes little sense. The aphorism should be "easy cases make no law."
77. For example, parties in relational contracts may leave certain terms deliberately
indeterminate, to be worked out or resolved judicially as problems arise. See Limits of
Expanded Choice, supra note 2, at 317-20.
78. Muris seems ,to suggest that opportunism occurs only after the contract is formed:
"the problem occurs after the contract is formed; it is not a problem of precontractual
monopoly." Muris, supra note 50, at 523. But this statement may be merely an expression of
the idea that precontractual monopoly is not necessary for opportunism rather than a statement that precontractual opportunism cannot occur.
Recent traditional writers focusing on "good faith," whose work parallels the opportunism approach, also seem to find meaningful the distinction between formation and performance and enforcement questions. See Eric G. Anderson, Good Faith in the Enforcement of
Contracts, 73 IOWA L. REv. 299, 326 n.102 (1988); Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract
and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369, 372 n.17
(1980).
79. Of course, the converse situation can also arise. That is, there are cases in which
there is no agreement, yet the promisee tries to argue that there is because some formation
rule is satisfied. See, e.g., Michael W. Miller, When the "Junker" Calls, This Man Is Ready
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Moreover, even if there is no formal agreement, opportunistic behavior can still occur at the negotiation stage, because the crucial point
(for ex post opportunism) is when one party makes sunk investments
in transaction-specific assets, not the magical moment when the contract comes into being.8"
C. The Traditions and Efficient Breach
Those familiar with the economic analysis of contract law may
have noticed a glaring omission from the previous discussion: the
theory of efficient breach. Because this theory has become almost
synonymous with the economic analysis of contract law-as well as
the primary foil for its detractors-I will offer a critique of the efficient breach theory. My goal is to show that the efficient breach
theory alone does not provide a viable economic theory of contract
law, and that the two traditions I have discussed provide a superior
approach.
The idea of efficient breach is very simple-deceptively" so.
According to the theory, the purpose of contract remedies is to encourage (or permit, to make the idea more palatable) a promisor not
to perform, but rather, to breach and pay damages whenever circumstances change after the contract is entered into so that breach and
payment of damages leaves the promisor better off and the promisee
no worse off than if performance occurred.8 That is, contract remedies should encourage (allow) the promisor to breach when breach is
Pareto superior to performance.82
As with the least-cost-avoider and opportunism traditions, economists posit a paradigmatic efficient breach situation to explain and
for Revenge, WALL ST. J., June 24, 1991, at Al (describing attempts by recipient of
telemarketing calls to use the unilateral contract device to bind telemarketers to promises to
pay the recipient a fee simply by making the call). I am grateful to Harry Flechtner for this
example.
80. See generally E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217 (1987) (arguing that
existing contract doctrines are adequate to protect the parties to failed negotiations where
there is no formal offer and acceptance). Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis.
1965), is the prime example. For recent examinations of formation issues by Law and
Economics scholars that incorporate opportunism considerations, see Avery Katz, The Strategic
Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game Theory and the Law of Contract Formation, 89
MICH. L. REV. 215 (1990); G. Richard Shell, Opportunism and Trust in the Negotiation of
Commercial Contracts: Toward a New Cause of Action, 44 VAND. L. Riv. 221 (1991).
81. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 47, § 12.3, at 846-47.
82. See Thomas S. Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a Unified
Theory of Contract Remedies, 83 MICH. L. REV. 341, 343 (1984).
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defend the concept. I will discuss the example provided by Professor
Ulen,83 though all are similar. Suppose a homeowner promises to
sell her house to a buyer for $100,000. The buyer values the house at
$115,000 and therefore enjoys a "consumer surplus" of $15,000.
Before the transfer of the house is completed, a second buyer offers
the homeowner $125,000 for the house. The efficient breach theory
holds that "if... efficiency is our goal, contract law should specify
a remedy for breach that will lead to ownership of the house by the
person who values it most, and should attempt to reach this result at
the lowest possible resource cost." 4 Expectation damages ($15,000)
provide the correct incentives for efficient breach, because whenever
the second buyer values the house more than the first buyer, the
homeowner will breach and pay the expectation damages.
Although the efficient breach theory can be (and has been) attacked from many different directions, 5 the criticism I want to stress
is that the theory assumes that the sole fact that the house is worth
more to the second buyer is sufficient to entitle the homeowner to
breach and pay expectation damages. 6 But this is simply not correct, either from a positive or normative perspective. In the example
given, we do not know enough about the purpose of the contract and
the reasons for the appearance of the second buyer-why the breach
occurred-to be able to answer meaningfully the question of which
remedy is most efficient. To see this point, let us consider several
alternative additional facts.
First, suppose after contracting with the first buyer, the homeowner actively went out looking for another buyer willing to pay
more for the house. Or suppose that the first buyer, after contracting
with the homeowner, told the homeowner that she wanted to resell
the house after doing some touch-up work and had lined up another
potential buyer for $115,000 but was still looking for a better resale
price. Then realizing the resale value of the house for the first time,
the homeowner found the second buyer. In these cases, the
homeowner's breach could be characterized as opportunistic. The
homeowner may be acting contrary to the ex ante expectations of the

83. See iU at 344-45.

84. I4 at 345.
85. See generally Craswell, supra note 44; Daniel A. Farber, Reassessing the Economic
Efficiency of Compensatory Damages for Breach of Contract, 66 VA. L. REV. 1443 (1980)
(criticizing the efficient breach theory); Friedmann, supra note 47; Ian R. Macneil, Efficient
Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REV. 947 (1982).
86. See Ulen, supra note 82, at 345.
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parties that once the deal was struck the first buyer was entitled to
any resale profits. That is, if a contract means anything, it means that
if one party wants to find a better deal, she should do it before committing herself to the other party. In this case, the contract remedy
should deter the homeowner from breaching in order to sell to a
second buyer, no matter what the value the second buyer places on
the house. 87 Specific performance, restitution damages, or lost profits
under a liberal reading of Hadley would accomplish this goal, as
would "market" damages if the breach occurred because of a change
in the market price."a
Second, suppose that the homeowner neglected to read the contract carefully upon signing, but soon thereafter discovered objectionable terms and then sought to sell the house to a second buyer.8 9 In
this case, it is possible that the breaching homeowner was the leastcost-avoider, but was not acting opportunistically. If so, reliance damages would arguably give the right incentive for future homeowners
to take cost-effective precautions."°
One can also construct scenarios in which the first buyer would

87. This example is similar to the "efficient theft" critique that others have leveled
against the efficient breach theory. If the only efficiency concern is whether the resource ends
up in the hands of the person who values it most, without regard to how it gets there, then
theft would be economically justified whenever the thief places a high enough value on the
resource. Law and Economics scholars have recognized this problem at least since Calabresi
and Melamed. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1124-27 (1972). The
problem with the efficient theft critique is that it can go too far. For example, Professor
Friedmann seems to suggest that any breach of contract is essentially a theft regardless of the
reason for the breach. See Friedmann, supra note 47, at 4-8. As I stated in the text, in my
view the reason for nonperformance is crucial to deciding both whether there is a breach and
what remedy should be applied.
88. Market damages are based on the difference between the contract price and the
price on the market at the time of breach or repudiation. "If the buyer is the injured party,
the market will often have risen, and the contract price is subtracted from the market
price . . . . If the seller is the injured party the market will often have fallen, and the
market price at which the seller could have resold is subtracted from the contract price."
FARNSWORTH, supra note 47, § 12.12, at 902-03.
89. See Laughlin v. Stephenson, 525 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (denying
specific performance in a similar situation).
90. If the homeowner can characterize her action as a "unilateral mistake," the law may
allow her to withdraw from the contract upon payment of reliance damages. See 3 ARTHUR
L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 612, at 700-02 (1960). It is not obvious why the
result should be different if there is no "mistake," but simply negligent promissory activity
on the part of the homeowner. But see Slawson, supra note 20, at 218-19 (arguing that in
mistake cases the wrong is the mistake rather than the breach and so these cases alone merit
reliance damages).
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be the opportunistic party or the least-cost-avoider. For example, the
first buyer might have known of the existence of the second buyer
and kept that fact from the homeowner through deceit or misrepresentation. Alternatively, the first buyer might have intentionally or negligently led the homeowner into thinking that the agreement allowed
the homeowner to continue searching for another buyer for a limited
period of time to secure the deal. In these cases, a court might conclude that there was no breach at all. Perhaps even more important,
the potential for opportunistic behavior on the part of the first buyer
may be the most compelling justification for not allowing greater
remedies than expectation damages, including specific performance,
liquidated damages, and punitive damages. The greater the remedy,
the greater the temptation for the first buyer to make a mountain out
of molehill in order to reap the large windfall.9 1
The point is that one cannot provide an intelligible answer to the
question of which contract remedy-or any other contract doctrine-is
most efficient without examining the parties' purposes in contracting
and their reasons for not performing.' Contract remedies, like other
contract rules, should be designed primarily to encourage contracting
parties to take cost-effective precautions and to refrain from opportunistic behavior, and therefore to improve contracting practice and
reduce the costs associated with breach.93 The efficient breach theory, by contrast, views breach as a kind of unavoidable accident. The
second buyer magically drops down from the sky. Perhaps some contract cases can be usefully analyzed this way, but in my view, most

91. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Clarkson et al., Liquidated Damages v. Penalties: Sense or
Nonsense?, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 351. This is just another example of this moral hazard
problem discussed below. See infra notes '117-19 and accompanying text.
An additional explanation for restrictions on more powerful remedies than expectation
damages is that these remedies result in excessive precautions by the promisor, including
quantitative precautions (making fewer promises). This explanation is the one stressed by
Goetz and Scott. See Limits of Expanded Choice, supra note 2, at 317-20; Mitigation Principle, supra note 1, at 1001-03; Relational Contracts, supra note 50, at 1089-91.
92. Professor Slawson has recently made a similar argument in defending the expectation
measure of damages. He states that the "compensation principle ...
requires that one
identify the conduct that ought to be deterred . . . ." Slawson, supra note 20, at 217. But he

does not differentiate between negligence and opportunism. Instead, he views the only relevant "conduct" to be deterred as nonperformance of promises. "The wrong in a contract case
is the failure to perform the promise. This failure to perform is the conduct we seek to deter
or punish by imposing liability." l I disagree that nonperformance is the wrong to be
deterred. There may be several "wrongs" to be deterred, of different weight. In my view, the
fact of nonperformance of a promise by itself does not define the relevant "wrong" that
ought to be deterred.
93. See Craswell, supra note 44, at 646-49 & n.43.
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litigated contract disputes involve behavior that can be characterized
as negligent, opportunistic, or both.' Put another way, in all contract disputes we can articulate alternative courses of conduct that we
want similarly situated parties to take in the future to avoid a similar
dispute. Even if the contingencies giving rise to the disputes are not
preventable, contract law can encourage the parties to take contractbased precautions.9'
The efficient breach theory is not so much wrong on its own
terms as it is irrelevant to most contract cases and doctrines. But
economists cannot be entirely to blame for the efficient breach theory.
Traditional contract doctrine and scholarship continue to preach the
dogma that contract is a field of strict liability for breach; the reason
for the breach generally does not matter in determining the remedy. 6 If economic theory can contribute anything to the development

94. That is not to say the characterization is easy. See Levmore, supra note 31, at 7374 (either party could be acting opportunistically). But that does not mean we should eschew
the attempt. But see POSNER, supra note 2, at 118 (arguing that most breaches are not
opportunistic but are either "efficient" or "involuntary").
95. Perhaps another example of this critique will make the point even clearer. Consider
the "valued form contract" for property insurance, that is, a contract that specifies a particular
value of the property insured. Suppose some contingency arises and the property is destroyed.
The insurance company would prefer not to pay anything; it "regrets" the contract. Suppose
further that it turns out for some reason that the value of the property to the insured is less
than the amount the insurance company has promised to pay. Should the insurance company
have the right to limit payment to the actual loss (including a refund of any excess premium
paid)? The efficient breach theory would suggest that it does, because the loss to the insurance company from performance exceeds the loss to the insured from nonperformance. But
the law does not allow the insurance company to be excused or to pay only actual damages
in this case "if it appears that the overvaluation was not intentional or made with an intent
to deceive . . . ." 4A JOHN A. APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 2602 (1969). Such a rule makes sense only if one looks at the reason for nonperformance. In many cases the insurance company is the least-cost-avoider because it can best
take precautions (such as more careful inspection of the property and clearer policies) in
order to prevent this problem from occurring in the future. See, e.g., Gamel v. Continental
Ins. Co., 463 S.W.2d 590, 594-95 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971).
96. See, e.g., Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540, 544 (1903)
(Holmes, J.); E. Allan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 CoLUM. L.
REV. 1145, 1146-47 (1970). Consider, for example, the famous exchange between Williston
and Coudert in the debate over § 90. See Debate on Section 88 (Later Section 90) of the
Restatement of Contracts, reprinted in A CONTRACTS ANTHOLOGY 222-32 (Peter Linzer ed.,
1989). The two disagreed over the measure of damages in a case where the reason for
enforcing the promise was the promisee's reliance rather than a bargain. Nowhere in the
debate did anyone raise the question of why the promise was made and why it was broken.
The same problem plagues the famous "Brooklyn Bridge" hypothetical: nowhere does anyone
raise the question of why A offered B $100 to walk across the Brooklyn Bridge or why A
revoked that offer when B had walked halfway across. See I. Maurice Wormser, The True
Conception of Unilateral Contracts, 26 YALE L.J. 136, 138-39 (1916), retracted in I. Maurice
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of contract doctrine, it is the debunking of this myth-not its perpetuation. Law and Economics scholars should therefore focus less on the
efficient breach theory and more on creating a general theory that
combines the least-cost-avoider and opportunism traditions.
II.

AN EXPANDED ECONOMIC THEORY
OF CONTRACT LAW

A.

The Traditions Compared

The two traditions of economic analysis of contract law outlined
in the previous sections are not recent developments. Yet it is puzzling that Law and Economics scholars have largely worked in one
tradition or the other without attempting to compare or combine
them.9 7 There are at least two possible explanations for this omission. One explanation is that the traditions are truly "distinct and
largely unrelated," as Goetz and Scott have said.9" Economists may
view the tension between the two traditions as simply a version of
the efficiency-equity (or similar economic-noneconomic) tradeoff,
which economists feel competent to identify but powerless to expound
upon in their role as economists." More strongly, in the jargon of
Critical Legal Studies scholars, there may be a "fundamental contradiction" between the two traditions-they cannot live comfortably to-

Wormser, Book Review, 3 J. LEGAL EDUC. 145, 146 (1950).
Even Judge Posner seems to accept at face value the idea that contract damages are
based largely on strict liability. See POSNER, supra note 2, at 180. Posner then attempts to
justify the greater use of strict liability in contract than in tort by arguing first, that market
insurance is more important in tort cases, and second, that the promisor in contract cases is
ordinarily the least-cost-avoider, whereas in tort cases we cannot ordinarily assume that the
tortfeasor is the least-cost-avoider.' The first argument ignores the possibility of 'contract-based
precautions,- see supra notes 24-44 and accompanying text, and recognized by Posner. See
POSNER, supra note 2, at 102-09. The second argument ignores the importance of opportunism in contract cases, which is odd given Posner's reliance on problems of opportunism and
bilateral monopoly to explain many contract doctrines.
97. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
98. See Mitigation Principle, supra note 1, at 968 n.5.
99. This aversion seems to be symptomatic of much Law and Economics scholarship,
see, e.g., Jeffrey L. Harrison, Trends and Traces: A Preliminary Evaluation of Economic
Analysis in Contract Law, 1988 ANN. SutRv. AM. L. 73, 100-04 (1989), which is somewhat
perplexing because some of the most innovative and powerful work in economics has involved the study of just such tradeoffs. See, e.g., ARROW, supra note 67, at 27 (explaining
that "at any moment an individual is necessarily faced with a conflict between his individual
desires and the demands of society-); ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 49; ALBERT 0.
HIRScHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970); CHARLEs E. LINDBLOM, PoLmcs AND
MARKETS (1977); ARTHUR M. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF (1975).
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gether. °° The alternative explanation is that the traditions are really
indistinguishable on some fundamental level, and so there is no need
to "combine" them. I argue in this section that both of these polar
positions are incorrect. In my view, the two traditions are distinct:
opportunistic behavior is more costly. But the traditions are not so
divergent that they cannot be combined into a more unified approach
that recognizes and accommodates the potential tradeoff between the
goal of deterring opportunism and the goal of deterring negligence. I
attempt such a combination in the next section.
The view that the least-cost-avoider and opportunism traditions
are distinct and contradictory finds support in the close relationship
between these two economic traditions and the two most prominent
philosophical paradigms within contract law: freedom of contract and
social regulation. The least-cost-avoider tradition strongly parallels the
traditional idea of "freedom of contract." The freedom of contract
paradigm champions individualism. It views contracting parties as
independent, self-reliant people, who consent to strict enforcement of
all contractual terms agreed upon and no enforcement of terms not
agreed upon.'' The necessary, though not often articulated, corollary of the freedom of contract paradigm is that it attributes contractual breakdowns to incompetence-the failure of one of the parties to
act responsibly. If only this party had investigated, inspected, read,
written, clarified, or insured, she would not be in the mess she is
now in. Moreover, the assumption underlying this view is that it
would have been relatively easy for the remiss contracting party to
have taken these actions. Therefore, we should preserve her autonomy
and encourage her (and others similarly situated) to be more responsible by putting the burden of liability on her. Expressed this way,
freedom of contract echoes the least-cost-avoider tradition, with its
emphasis on putting liability on the party in the best position to take
precautions.
On the other hand, the opportunism tradition aligns more closely
with the paradigm of contract law as a means of social control that
fosters community ideals rather than individualism. The theme of this
paradigm, which we might generically term "social regulation," encompasses the ideas in contract law that contracting parties are inter-

100. See MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 16-17 (1987). The term
comes from Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV.
205, 211-13 (1979).

101. See, e.g., Kessler, supra note 3, at 3-6.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1992

27

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 4 [1992], Art. 4
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol., 20:941

dependent, vulnerable people, who necessarily operate within a social
system of widely shared norms and expectations. Under this paradigm, contractual breakdowns arise from the wrongful behavior-the
violation of social norms-of one of the parties. What the parties in
fact expected and did is more important in this view than what they
might have done differently. Because it is difficult for someone to
guard against the wrongful behavior of another, we should protect the
victim by putting liability on the wrongdoer. This view parallels the
opportunism tradition which focuses on deterring wrongful behavior.
Although drawing these parallels between economic perspectives
and traditional paradigms highlights the distinction between the leastcost-avoider and opportunism approaches, it overlooks the strong
similarities between the two approaches. These similarities suggest an
alternative explanation for the failure to distinguish and combine the
two traditions: economists find no meaningful difference between
them.
For example, though it may appear that the two traditions view
the purpose of contract law differently, this difference is largely illusory. The least-cost-avoider tradition seems to view law as a means to
create desirable incentives for future behavior (deterrence)," °2 while
the opportunism tradition seems to be more concerned with doing
justice between the parties in this case (equity). 0 3 But this distinction between a "next case perspective" and a "this case perspective,"
of which Law and Economics scholars"°4 and practicing lawyers0 5

102. See COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 8, at 26-27; Lewis A. Kornehauser, The New
Economic Analysis of Law: Legal Rules and Incentives, in LAW AND ECONOMICS 27, 27-55
(Nicholas Mercuro ed., 1989).
103. But see Muris, supra note 50, at 526-27 (detailing four ways by which potential
victims can reduce opportunism).
104. See, e.g., ROBERT E. SCOTr & DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY
15 (1988) (noting a distinction between a "redistributive function" and a "behavior modification function" of contract law). This distinction may derive from the fact that lawyers and
economists use the term "equity" differently. When economists speak of "equity" they usually
refer to the distribution of income, whether in society at large or between two parties to a
dispute. A decision based on equity, to an economist, is based solely on the respective
economic positions of the parties, regardless of their conduct. To a lawyer, by contrast,
equity most often refers either to how the parties behave toward each other (fairly or unfairly) or to a relaxing of seemingly inflexible legal rules in order to prevent some injustice.
See, e.g., P.S. Atiyah, Book Review, 95 HARV. L. REV. 509, 524-25 (1981) ('Courts may
rely on egalitarian values not in order to redistribute wealth between plaintiff and defendant,
but to insist, for instance, that the defendant should treat this plaintiff in the same way he
has treated other contracting parties."); cf. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 87, at 1093-1105
(broadly defining distributional concerns and "other justice reasons" as alternative goals to
efficiency in the setting of entitlements). If one views equity this way, the "conflict" between
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seem to be particularly fond, does not really differentiate the two
traditions. The two traditions can both comfortably fit within the
"next case perspective" of the economic approach to law. If the purpose of contract law is to develop legal rules that minimize transaction costs (or equivalently maximize the joint profits) of the contracting parties by creating incentives for future parties to engage in efficient contracting behavior, then negligence and opportunism can both
be viewed as costly types of behavior that reduce the joint profits of
the parties and therefore should be deterred."°6 Making opportunistic
parties liable should deter future opportunistic behavior at least as
much as (and perhaps more than) making negligent parties liable
deters future negligent behavior."°7
Similarly, it may seem that the two traditions focus on different
time frames. The least-cost-avoider tradition seems to take more of an
ex ante perspective: the relevant time for decision-making by the
parties is the time of contracting, when the parties can take precautions. In contrast, the opportunism tradition seems to take more of an
ex post perspective: the relevant time of decision is after the parties
have made sunk investments in the contractual relationship and the
regret contingency has occurred, when the parties are most vulnerable
to opportunistic behavior. It is true that the least-cost-avoider ap-

equity and efficiency becomes less apparent, unless efficiency, for some reason, usually
requires strict adherence to legal rules. Cf. id. at 1090 n.4 (arguing that the reliance by the
state on morality is efficient).
105. Consider the following statement from perhaps the opinion most beloved by Law
and Economics scholars, Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970):
A court performs its essential function when it decides the rights of parties before
it. Its decision of private controversies may sometimes greatly affect public issues.
Large questions of law are often resolved by the manner in which private litigation
is decided. But this is normally an incident to the court's main function to settle
controversy. It is a rare exercise of judicial power to use a decision in private
litigation as a purposeful mechanism to achieve direct public objectives greatly
beyond the rights and interests before the court.
I, at 871. Of course, the court then goes on to exercise judicial power in just such a way.
106. Both traditions may also be viewed as being concerned with the behavior of the
parties in this case. Both traditions measure conduct against some external standard-the
reasonable person in the least-cost-avoider tradition, and the agreed upon obligations or moral
constraints in the opportunism tradition-to determine whether liability should be imposed.
The important point is that the usefulness of the distinction is far from apparent.
107. It could be-and often is-argued that attempts to deter opportunistic behavior in
the future are misguided because such rules will have unintended and costly consequences.
This may be true, but this observation alone does not distinguish attempts to deter negligent
behavior, which may also have unintended and costly consequences. Moreover, the observation ignores the fact that failing to deter opportunistic behavior may also have unintended and
costly consequences.
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proach developed in tort law, in which high ex ante transaction costs
are the biggest problem, while the opportunism approach developed in
contract law, in which high ex post transaction costs are the biggest
problem.' 8 But as I argued in the previous section, there is no necessary connection between negligence and ex ante behavior, or between opportunism and ex post behavior. Both negligent and opportunistic contracting behavior can occur at any time during the contracting process. Failure to mitigate can be viewed as ex post negligence,
while fraud, misrepresentation, or incomplete disclosure can be
viewed as ex ante opportunism.
Nor does it seem at first glance to be a meaningful difference
that the least-cost-avoider tradition focuses on acts of omission-failure to take cost-effective precautions-while the opportunism
tradition focuses on acts of commission-affirmative wrongdoing. On
the one hand, contracting parties can take various precautions to protect against not only regret contingencies, but also opportunistic behavior. Although the opportunistic party can simply refrain from
opportunistic behavior, the victim of opportunism can also protect
herself through such devices as security deposits, progress payments,
collateral, hostage-giving, and background checks."° We could easily deem the party who could take precautions more cheaply the
"least-cost-avoider' of opportunistic behavior. ' .. On the other hand,
negligently engaging in an activity without taking proper precautionary measures could be viewed as an affirmative (intentional) improper
action, especially if the activity is repeated over time in the face of a
known danger. At least in cases of gross negligence, a party expecting to be bailed out by the law could be characterized as opportunis11
tic. '

108. In fact, the key difference between contracts and torts may not be, as some economists have asserted, that contracts involve situations of low transaction costs and torts involve
situations of high transaction costs. Compare POSNER, supra note 2, at 95 (contracts occur in
a setting of low transaction costs) with iL at 164 (transaction costs in accidents are high).
Rather it is that torts generally involve high ex ante transaction costs, while contracts generally involve high ex post transaction costs. As a result, the problem of opportunism is not
usually seen as essential to tort law (at least unintentional torts) though it pervades contract
law.
109. See ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 49, at 33-34; GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at
18-19; Kronman, supra note 69, at 9-24.
110. Victor Goldberg has suggested that in some cases we might want to impose a "duty
not to be too vulnerable7 and therefore not compensate a victim of opportunism in order to
encourage precaution-taking. GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 71. I take issue with this position
in the next section.
111. This blurring of the distinction between opportunism and negligence often occurs in
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Economists do not always recognize the similarities between
negligent and opportunistic behavior, however. For example, economists are often quick to point out that market forces tend to diminish
the threat of opportunism. In a competitive market, a firm that gets a
reputation for opportunism will not keep its customers and suppliers
for very long."' But the same could be said about negligent contracting behavior. Incompetent firms would not seem to have any
better chance of holding onto their customers or suppliers than sleazy
firms. In fact, in some cases the brand of incompetence might be
worse. The business world often seems to admire
undetected and
11 3
incompetence.
so,
not
behavior;
sleazy
successful
Economists also emphasize the ability of parties to contract
around legal rules as a justification for nonintervention to remedy
opportunistic behavior. This argument typically appears in discussions
of unconscionable contract terms. But once the focus shifts from the
harshness of the term or the poverty of the bargainer-substantive
unconscionability-to the conduct of exploiting an unexpected
term-procedural unconscionability" 4-it is no longer clear why a

the area of product liability, which explains in terms of the theory presented here the usual
characterization of this area of law as lying "on the border" between contract and tort.
112. The so-called reputation effect argument has been recognized at least since the time
of Plato when Socrates made the point while defending himself at his trial. See Plato, The
Apology, reprinted in THE LAST DAYS OF SOCRATES 43, 55-56 (Hugh Tredennick ed., 1969).
113. In a recent article, two Harvard Business School professors argue that reputation is
not a very effective deterrent of opportunistic behavior. See Amar Bhide & Howard H.
Stevenson, Why Be Honest if Honesty Doesn't Pay, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct., 1990, at
121. They argue (im my view convincingly) that reputation often fails as a mechanism for
enforcing trust. First, the benefits of doing business with powerful opportunistic parties are
too great to pass up. Id. at 123. Second, "cognitive inertia" often leads business people to
search for reasons to trust and ignore conflicting evidence. Id. at 124. Third, it is often
difficult to know with sufficient certainty that the other side has been opportunistic in the
past. Id. at 125. And finally, business people believe that a leopard can change its spots.
Nevertheless, the authors argue that most business people are honest most of the time
because their personal morality leads them to be that way. Moreover, to the extent that
opportunism does exist, the authors argue that we should not worry about it because to
punish opportunism too frequently and too harshly diminishes the value of honesty, dampens
entrepreneurial risk taking, and hinders efficient adjustment to changed circumstances. I find
the assertion that most business people are not opportunistic implausible in the context of litigation. I also find the "best of all possible worlds" mentality disturbing. Surely one of the
purposes of law is to encourage us to do better, to move us toward a better society, not
simply to let us shrug our shoulders at the wrongdoers of the world. See Robert M. Cover,
The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 9
(1983) ("Law may be viewed as a system of tension or a bridge linking a concept of a
reality to an imagined alternative . . .).
114. See Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause,
115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 487 (1967).
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party held liable for opportunistic behavior would be any more likely
to contract explicitly for the right to be opportunistic than a party
held liable for negligent behavior would be to contract for the right
to be negligent.
As these examples show, the similarities between the two traditions can explain, only in part, the failure of economists to explore
the relationship between them. The failure seems to stem as much
from a tendency among economists to underestimate the importance
of opportunistic behavior. Professor Williamson has repeatedly noted
this tendency." 5 Another example of this tendency that Professor
Williamson discusses is the use of the term "moral hazard." Economists often define moral hazard as the decreased incentive of an insured party to take precautions,"' which comports with the leastcost-avoider approach. Economists use the concept of moral hazard,
so defined, to argue for example that strict liability in tort, which
fully insures a victim, is inefficient, absent a contributory negligence
defense or its equivalent, because it decreases the incentive for the
victim to take precautions." 7 In contract law, moral hazard can help
explain why reliance and consequential damages, which fully insure
the promisee, are often inefficient: they decrease the incentive of a
promisee to take precautions against breach by tempering reliance.
But moral hazard can also be viewed more broadly to include an ex
post fabrication of losses or coverage: if one is insured against a
particular kind of loss, one has the incentive to define any loss suffered to fall within the coverage of the insurance policy and to exaggerate the extent of loss."'

115. See, e.g. ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 49, at 65 (arguing that "[t]he study of
almost entirely on assumptions of differential risk
still relies ...
contract doctrine ...
aversion, concerns over the hazards of opportunism having been suppressed").

116. See, e.g., POLINSKY, supra note 12, at 54; Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral
Hazard: Comment, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 531, 535 (1968) (defining moral hazard as the
tendency of insurance to increase usage of care by lowering the cost of care, and distinguishing "outright fraud" and "moral perfidy"); cf. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW
AND ECONOMICS 65-66 (1988) (distinguishing the "extreme example" of an insured's incentive
to burn his home from the "more realistic example" of an insured's failure to take precautions against his car being stolen).
117. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 116, at 65-66.
118. See ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 49, at 51 n.8 (explaining his reluctance to
use the term "moral hazard" because it "does not ordinarily elicit sensitivity to the full set of
ex ante and ex post efforts to lie, cheat, steal, mislead, disguise, obfuscate, feign, distort, and
confuse"). Kenneth Arrow has also stressed a broader notion of moral hazard. See ARROW,
supra note 67, at 36 (including arson as a type of moral hazard response to fie insurance);
Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Further Comment, 58 AM. ECON. REV.
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Although both forms of activity could be viewed as moral hazard, Williamson suggests that the two types of behavior-inadvertent
and intentional-are meaningfully different." 9 The question is how.
The simple (perhaps overly simplistic) economic answer is that "opportunistic" is a label we place on a category of activity that we
believe imposes relatively higher "social costs" than the category of
activity we label "negligent."' 20
Opportunistic behavior produces no social benefits; instead of
adding to the net wealth of society it merely redistributes wealth from
one party to another."' Because opportunistic behavior, like criminal activity, violates social norms, any private gains to the opportunistic party must be excluded from the social calculus." 2 Investments
537, 538 (1968).
119. Moral philosophers would agree. See, e.g., SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 8 (1978) ("We must single out, therefore, from the countless ways
in which we blunder misinformed through life, that which is done with the intention to
mislead; and from the countless partial stabs at truth, those which are intended to be truthful.").
120. Economists distinguish "social costs" from "private costs." Each type of cost is an
opportunity cost, that is, a "benefit foregone by employing a resource in a way that denies
its use to someone else," POsNER, supra note 2, at 6. A private cost is a benefit foregone
by an individual resource user. A social cost is a benefit foregone by society from the use
of a resource. A resource owner in deciding whether and how to use a resource may consider only private costs, that is the best alternative use to which she may put the resource. She
may not consider the social costs, that is the alternative uses to which others may put the
resource. See RICHARD G. LIpsEY & PETER 0. STEINER, ECONOmiCS 255 (4th ed. 1975). Law
and Economics is largely about the role of the law in transforming social costs-such as
accidents, pollution, breaches, and crimes-into private costs. In fact, the Coase Theorem is
nothing more than an argument that in a world of zero transaction costs, many social costs
become private costs even without legal intervention once one recognizes that potential
"bribes" from a non-entitlement-holder can be viewed as foregone resources.
121. That is not to say that all redistribution of wealth is undesirable, even among
individuals, but merely that there is no reason to presume that a redistribution by one
individual solely to enrich himself at the expense of another is likely to achieve any social
goal.
122. See Jeff L. Lewin & William N. Trumbull, The Social Value of Crime?, 10 INT'L
REV. L. & ECON. 271 (1990):
[Tihe total exclusion of criminal gains would appear to be mandated by prevailing
social norms. If one accepts the premise that welfare economics must rest on an
ethical foundation beyond pure utilitarianism, we believe that there exists a broad
consensus in support of the proposition that criminal gains should not be counted
in welfare economics. The term "criminal" represents an implicit societal judgment
that the conduct has no social value.
Id at 280 (footnote omitted). The same could be said about opportunistic contractual behavior. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 116, at 252 n.2 (discussing coercion and duress in
contract law and stating that "widely held community norms" require "ignoring the possibility
that the threat-maker derives utility simply from the act of making a threat or of bullying
others-).
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in opportunistic behavior and in taking precautions against such behavior can therefore be viewed as "deadweight losses," that is, decreases in society's total wealth."n
In contrast, negligence can be viewed as an unintended and
inevitable byproduct of potentially productive activity. t24 To borrow
from the antitrust field, negligent behavior is usually "ancillary" to
some desirable behavior, while opportunism is "naked" coercion.t25
The costs of negligent behavior must therefore be offset against this
wealth-producing potential, while there is no such offset against the
costs of opportunistic behavior.'26 As a result, the relative social
cost (foregone social benefit) of negligent activity is likely to be
smaller than the social cost of opportunistic behavior.'27
Put another way, the social costs of avoiding opportunistic behavior are lower than the social costs of avoiding negligent behavior.
Thus, as between an opportunistic and a negligent party, the opportunistic party is always the least-cost-avoider.'
The social (though
not private) cost of precaution against opportunism is zero. An opportunistic party can simply refrain from opportunistic behavior, usually

123. Judge Posner in his treatise describes coercive transfers as those that occur in
situations of low transaction costs, and do not lead to value-maximizing exchanges. See
POSNER, supra note 2, at 109-10 (fraud), 113 (duress), 208 (intentional torts), 231-32 (common law crimes); see also COOTER & ULEN, supra note 116, at 252 (defining coerced
exchange as a "trade extracted under the threat to destroy existing value"). In my view, all
opportunistic behavior, not merely these more blatant forms of coercion, can usefully be
described this way. It is not clear whether or how Posner differentiates "coercive" from
"opportunistic" behavior.
124. By "unintended" I mean with some probability less than "substantial certainty," to
use traditional torts jargon. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 8, at 36 (5th ed. 1984). By "inevitable" I mean that the probability is
greater than zero so that if the activity is repeated over time an accident will occur.
125. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 283 (6th Cir. 1898)
(Taft, J.), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). The fact that opportunism may be "subtle," that is,
difficult to detect, does not make it any less "naked" than price fixing that is difficult to
detect.
126. Note again that "oppressive" contract terms, unless they are also unexpected, are not
"opportunistic" and do in many cases have ancillary benefits such as reduced costs due to
standardization.
127. Negligent activity is therefore more similar to activity we label "pollution" or
"competition" than activity we label "crime"; that is, it represents activity for which we are
willing to weigh the benefits to the "wrongdoer" against the costs to the "victim."
128. See POSNER, supra note 2, at 112 (fraud is unlawful even if the buyer could
unmask the lie at very low cost), 173 (a landowner is not liable for negligent injuries to
trespassers because the accident could have been prevented at lower cost by the trespasser by
not trespassing), 210 (contributory negligence is not a defense to an intentional tort because
the cost of avoidance is lower to the injurer). Recall that the least-cost-avoider concept is
justifiable in these "alternative care" cases. See supra note 23.
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at no loss in social wealth, by substituting market transactions that
effect the same transfer of resources. We prefer that people use the
market when that is feasible: they should buy cars rather than steal
them; they should bargain explicitly for desired contract terms rather
than sneak them in. 29 The market assures that bargains transfer resources from lower to higher-valued uses. 30
The availability of cheap alternatives explains in part why we
tend to care more about deterring opportunistic behavior itself than
about encouraging victims to take precautions against opportunism.
The law has always recognized this priority, at least implicitly, in its
development of "equity" jurisprudence. 31 In particular, the negligence of the victim does not usually result in liability for victims of
fraud, trespass, intentional tort, or crime.'32
In contrast, the social costs of precautions against negligence are
always positive and may be quite high. 133 In the extreme case, the
cost of eliminating negligent behavior may be the elimination of the
accompanying productive activity. 34 Activity we label negligence,

129. Professors Haddock, McChesney, and Spiegel refer to conduct that forgoes consensual exchange in favor of socially costly takings as "contractual bypass," which they argue
justifies punitive sanctions. See Haddock et al., supra note 55, at 18, 27, 32, 50.
130. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 116, at 254-55.
131. See Roscoe Pound, Note, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454 (1909):
It has been said that the common law will not help a fool. But equity exists to
help and protect him. It is because there are fools to be defrauded and imposed
upon, and unfortunates to meet with accidents and careless to make mistakes, that
we have courts of equity.
Id at 483.
132. An unfortunate and manifestly unjust exception to this principle is the law governing
rape. See generally Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1094 (1986) (arguing that "in
striking contrast to [other common law crimes] . . . courts . . . have focused almost incidentally on the defendant-and almost entirely on the victim"), 1162 (arguing that "notions of
male entitlement and female contributory fault . . . are at the core of the common law
tradition"). For example, "the conclusion that no force is present may emerge as a judgment
not that the man did not act unreasonably, but as a judgment that the woman victim did."
Id at 1112. In contrast to rape, for other crimes such as false pretenses, carelessness of the
victim is no defense. See id at 1119 & n.91. In rape law, "the definition of nonconsent
requires victims of rape, unlike victims of any other crime, to demonstrate their 'wishes'
through physical resistance." Id at 1122. Professor Estrich notes at several points the lapses
in precautions for which courts and juries have faulted women: "hitchhiking, dating, and
talking to men at parties," id at 1173; agreeing to "drinks, rides or dates, or fail[ing] to
react strongly enough to sexual suggestions and overtures," ilaat 1178 n.318.
133. See generally CosS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 8, at 198-226 (discussing the costs
associated with reducing accidents).
134. Of course, at a certain point, the costs of precaution become so high relative to the
expected losses associated with the regret contingency that we would cease to label the
failure to take precautions "negligence." While such "unavoidable accidents" may be common
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moreover, often occurs in situations of high transaction costs in which
substitute market transactions are not cheap alternatives, or at least
are not deliberately bypassed. 3
There is another crucial sense in which opportunism is more
costly behavior than negligence. Opportunistic behavior imposes higher costs on third parties-has greater spillover effects-than does
negligent behavior. Sissela Bok's warning about the contagious harms
of lying applies equally to other forms of opportunistic contracting
behavior:
These practices clearly do not affect only isolated individuals. The
veneer of social trust is often thin. As lies spread-by imitation, or
in retaliation, or to forestall suspected deception-trust is damaged.
Yet trust is a social good to be protected just as much as the air
we breathe and the water we drink. When it is damaged, the community as a whole suffers; and when it is destroyed, societies falter
and collapse.'36
Economists too have recognized that trust is an extremely valuable
and vulnerable resource, which the market alone cannot be counted
on to supply. 37 Trust is essentially a conscious decision not to take
precautions or other preemptive action in the face of potential opportunism because of a belief that such opportunism will not in fact
occur. If opportunism does occur, and goes unpunished or minimally
punished, contracting parties will adjust their beliefs about the likelihood of opportunism in the future; trust will diminish, parties will
spend more resources on various precautionary and insurance devices,
and will invest more in engaging in opportunistic behavior, whether
because it is now cheaper or viewed as more acceptable. By damaging trust beyond the existing transaction, therefore, opportunistic behavior imposes large social costs.'38

in contracts cases, I have my doubts, and am therefore focusing on what is at least an
important class of cases in which we want at least one of the parties to alter her future
behavior because she can do so at relatively low cost.
135. An example that arises in contracts cases is a mistaken bid submitted at the last
minute.
136. BOK, supra note 119, at 26.
137. See ARROW, supra note 67, at 23; POSNER, supra note 2, at 261-62.
138. Cooter and Ulen make essentially the same argument to show that criminal sanctions, rather than simply compensatory damages, are economically desirable if a driver
intentionally runs down a victim:
If there were no criminal prosecution, fear of being intentionally hit by drivers
might spread among pedestrians. The spread of fear among pedestrians is a loss of
peace and security, and because those are public goods, it is appropriate that the
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Although unpunished negligent behavior in one context may also
result in third party effects-that is, lead to more carelessness or
increased defensive precautions in general-this result is less likely
for several reasons. First, even if negligent behavior is punished,
people do not "trust" others to be careful to the same degree that
people trust others to be honorable, because people realize that even
if others are generally careful, some negligence is inevitable.'3 9
Thus, a failure to punish negligence in a particular case would lead to
fewer additional precautions than a failure to punish opportunism.
Second, an individual is more likely to be hurt by his own carelessness than by his own opportunistic behavior, and thus may have
private incentives to take at least self-protecting precautions even if
negligence is legally tolerated. Finally, even though the fear of increased carelessness in others will engender more precaution-taking to
prevent falling victim to this carelessness, these precautions by potential victims, unlike precautions against opportunism, may in fact be
efficient.
Differentiating negligence from opportunism on the basis of the
relative social costs associated with each activity is helpful. Nevertheless, we should not feel too comfortable with this somewhat pat distinction, as we should not with any legal category. In certain cases,
the private costs of avoiding opportunistic behavior for an individual
contractor may be so high that we want to "count" the benefits the
individual receives from that behavior in deciding whether and how
much to punish it. For example, we might want to treat a poor thief
stealing necessities differently from other thieves."4 On the other
hand, the opportunity costs of foregoing negligent behavior might be
extremely low (action we label "gross" negligence, for example). But
we should not be overly pessimistic either. Categories can be useful if
we maintain a healthy skepticism toward them and remember the
reasons for creating them. The point I have tried to stress here is that
the negligence and opportunism traditions are neither incompatible nor

state should take an interest in punishing those who spread fear and insecurity.
COOTER & ULEN, supra note 116, at 512. It is somewhat surprising that Cooter and Ulen do
not make the same point about trust in their chapter on contract law.
139. See POSNER, supra note 2, at 175 (noting that everyone is occasionally negligent
because the cost of reducing to zero the probability of negligent behavior is too high). The
admonition of "drive defensively" is perhaps the best example of this phenomenon.
140. The Law and Economics literature has struggled mightily with the question of
whether and when the benefits to a wrongdoer should "count" in the social calculus. See
generally Lewin & Trumbull, supra note 122.
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identical; thus, combining them is neither impossible nor inconsequential.
B.

The Traditions Combined

In combining the least-cost-avoider and opportunism traditions,
we may delineate three classes of cases. In two of the classes the
traditions do not conflict, and so there is no problem combining
them. In the third class, the traditions do conflict and present what I
term the negligence-opportunism tradeoff. For this class of cases, I
advocate giving a presumptive priority to deterring opportunism.
1. Cases Involving Only Negligence or Opportunism
The first class of cases includes those that present problems
predominantly of negligence or opportunism, but not both.' 4 ' For
example, in deciding which party should bear the loss associated with
a mistaken transmission, identifying the least-cost-avoider-who could
have taken precautions most cheaply-may be much more important
than trying to identify opportunistic behavior. If a mistake or misunderstanding is truly an "accident," it could be that neither party is
behaving opportunistically. 4 2 On the other hand, if the issue is
whether or not a quantity variation in an output or requirements contract was made in "good faith," articulating precautions the parties
could have taken ex ante may be less useful than isolating the
parties' reasonable expectations and identifying which party is acting
contrary to those expectations ex post. There may be precautions that
could be taken in such a case-insurance or more detailed provisions,
for example-but these precautions may be exceedingly costly or it
may not be obvious which party is in a better position to take them.
If a class of cases involving only negligence or opportunism exists
(and I am somewhat skeptical), then there is certainly no difficulty in

141. Another possible category is contract disputes involving neither opportunism nor
negligence. These "unavoidable accident" cases are in my view rare, or at least economically
uninteresting because if they really exist, then any outcome in the case would have no effect
on future contracting behavior. One may view cases in which the defense of impracticability
or one of its variants is successfully invoked as examples of this class, but even here there
are precautionary measures (such as insuring) that we want to encourage parties to take. I
will therefore not pursue this class further.
142. In addition, absent the potential for opportunistic behavior, one could argue that
damages should be limited to "reliance" damages. That is, the case should be treated as a
"tort" case rather than as a "contract" case. This is not because the case is not "really" a
contract case, but because there is no need to deter the behavior that is the primary concern
of contract doctrine-opportunism.
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combining the two approaches, because one of the two approaches
predominates and the other can be safely ignored. I will not stop to
debate whether or not this set of cases is empty, because even if it is
not, it poses no threat to a unified theory.
2.

Cases in Which the Least-Cost-Avoider and the Most-LikelyOpportunist Are the Same Party
A second class of cases also poses no threat to a unified theory,
but unlike the first class, it generates some useful insights. These are
cases in which the least-cost-avoider and the most-likely-opportunist
are one and the same. In such cases, the two traditions are complementary rather than contradictory, and therefore there is again no
need to choose between them. This class of cases serves as a counterexample to the Critical Legal Studies assertion of a "fundamental
contradiction" to the extent that the assertion is that a contradiction
must necessarily exist in every case. It also supports the view that
there are such things as "easy cases," if by such a term we mean
cases in which identifiable values or purposes that often conflict do
not do so. 14 3
As an example of this class of cases, consider the objective
theory of contracts. This theory maintains that courts should determine contractual intent based on the objective "manifestations" of the
parties rather than what they were subjectively thinking at the
time.' 44 Such a theory can be justified under either the least-costavoider or the opportunism traditions. Under the least-cost-avoider
tradition, we want to encourage parties who seek to override "normal"
expectations to take precautions in clarifying intent. We also want to
discourage negligent promissory activity.145 Therefore, we put liability on the idiosyncratic party or the party who acts as if she intends

143. See Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71
HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958). Professor Fuller endorses a similar explanation of "easy cases" as
those in which several possible purposes of a legal rule are satisfied by interpreting the rule
in a particular way: "If the rule excluding vehicles from parks seems easy to apply in some
cases, I submit this is because . . . whether the rule be intended to preserve quiet in the
park, or to save carefree strollers from injury, we know, 'without thinking,' that a noisy
automobile must be excluded." At at 663; cf. Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1057, 1060 (1975) (defining hard cases as those for which "no settled rule dictates a
decision either way").
144. See THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 4-5 (Anthony T. Krornan & Richard A.
Posner eds., 1979).
145. Some have viewed this as the only legitimate justification for the objective theory.
See, e.g., Clarke B. Whittier, The Restatement of Contracts and Mutual Assent, 17 CAL. L.
REv. 441, 443 (1929).
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to contract even if she does not really want to. Less obviously, perhaps, the opportunism tradition, which aims to deter contracting behavior that runs counter to the parties' expectations or conventional
morality, also supports the objective theory.' We do not allow a
party to deny contractual obligation on the ground that she did not
subjectively intend to bind herself, not only because she might have
been negligent or idiosyncratic, but also because the chances are good
that such a person is lying. 4 7 Put another way, under a subjective
theoryt48of contractual intent, the potential for opportunistic behavior is
great.
The idea that the objective theory can be justified under either of
the two traditions may not seem all that illuminating. 4 9 But the interesting insight one can glean from combining the two traditions is
that the justification for the objective theory is strongest when the
two traditions converge in suggesting that liability be placed on the

146. Law and Economics scholars tend to justify the objective theory with reference to
some variant of the least-cost-avoider theory. Curiously, they tend to omit any reference to
the potential for opportunism or' bad faith on the part of the promisor. See SCOTr & LESLIE,
supra note 104, at 26-28; THE ECONOMICS OF LAW, supra note 144, at 5.
147. The party denying subjective intent may be engaging in either ex ante opportunism-she never intended to go through with the promise-or ex post opportunism-she
originally did intend to go through with the promise, but now finds it convenient not to do
SO.
148. Judge Hand's famous explanation of the objective theory in Hotchkiss v. National
City Bank of New York, 200 F. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), is not necessarily inconsistent with
this view. Hand stated:
A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or individual,
intent of the parties. A contract is an obligation attached by the mere force of law
to certain acts of the parties, usually words, which ordinarily accompany and represent a known intent. If, however, it were proved by twenty bishops that either party, when he used the words, intended something else than the usual meaning
which the law imposes upon them, he would still be held, unless there were some
mutual mistake, or something else of the sort.
Il at 293. Hand's statement might simply mean that in the absence of any opportunism,
there is still a justification for the objective theory, based on the least-cost-avoider idea of
putting the burden on the idiosyncratic bargainer to clarify intent. Such a case would fall
within the first class previously discussed. The real question is not what would happen if
twenty bishops proved that either party truthfully believed his own interpretation, but rather
what would happen if the bishops proved that either party knew what the other's expectation
was and was lying now in denying this understanding. If Hand would still hold such testimony irrelevant, his position is inconsistent with the theory advanced in the text.
149. It might be more illuminating in other areas of the law, such as procedure. Consider
the rule that prohibits a defendant from proving at trial a defense not pleaded. See FLEMING
JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 4.7 (3d ed. 1985). Such a
rule might be justified not only to deter negligence on the part of the defendant, but also
because of the potential opportunism involved in making such a claim at such a late date.
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party asserting a subjective intent different from her objective manifestations. The cases in which the least-cost-avoider or the more-probable-opportunist is not the promisor denying objectively manifested
contractual intent, are precisely those cases in which the objective
theory has come under the greatest criticism. For example, suppose
both parties share an unusual understanding of a contractual term
even though such an understanding is "objectively" unreasonable. In
this case, the party relying on the "objective" manifestation would be
the opportunistic party and perhaps the least-cost-avoider as well, because at least within that contractual relationship she was the idiosyncratic party who should have signaled a different meaning. Thus,
although there may be good reasons for disregarding subjective intent
to enter into a contract, subjective intent should always be relevant to
the question of why a party wants to get out of a contract.
A second example of a contract doctrine that is most defensible
when the two traditions converge is the general rule that unilateral
mistake is less likely to be excused than mutual mistake. 5 ' The traditional Law and Economics defense of this rule, given by Kronman,
relies on the least-cost-avoider tradition.' If the mistake is unilateral, it is likely that the mistaken party is the least cost information
gatherer.152 The inference is weaker if the mistake is mutual. But
the unilateral mistake doctrine also makes sense under the opportunism approach because if the mistake is unilateral, it is more likely
that the party claiming mistake was not really mistaken at all but is
simply trying to rewrite the contract. In contrast, if both parties are
mistaken about the same fact, the mistake is in some sense objectively verified; it is less likely the mistaken party is making up the mistake to get out of a bad deal. The distinction between unilateral and
mutual mistake becomes more controversial when it appears the nonmistaken party was acting opportunistically.
The insights gained from the complementary use of the two
traditions need not only be used to support existing contract doctrines,
but can also be used to critique them. A good example is Peevyhouse

150. See Kronman, supra note 5, at 5 ("[i]t is still "black letter law' that a promisor
whose mistake is not shared by the other party is less likely to be relieved of his duty to
perform than a promisor whose mistake happens to be mutual.").
151. Id at 5-8.
152. The mistaken party is not always the least-cost-avoider, the presumption is rebuttable. The Restatement does provide for excuse for unilateral mistake if "the other party . . .
had reason to know of the mistake ... or where his fault caused the mistake." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153 cmt. a (1981).
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v. Garland Coal & Mining Co. 13 In that case, a mining company
promised to restore a farmer's land to its prior condition-apparently
at the farmer's insistence-in return for being allowed to strip-mine
the land. The mining company breached the promise and the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma awarded damages based only on the diminution in
value of the land rather than on the cost of completion. Although the
case has been frequently discussed and criticized, the point here is
that the critique is strongest if one believes-as I happen to-that the
mining company was both the least-cost-avoider and the most-likelyopportunist. The farmer apparently (according to the facts presented
by the dissent) took the precaution of making his idiosyncratic preferences regarding his land known at the outset;154 it is not clear what
other precautions the farmer could have taken. 5 On the other hand,
it seems that the mining company might not have made an adequate
inquiry into the feasibility and cost of going through with its promise,
and therefore could easily be viewed as the more negligent party.
Moreover, if the mining company found out about the cost of restoration in the middle of the contract, it may have negligently failed to
mitigate the damages to the farmer.
As for opportunism, while the farmer might have been exaggerating the value of his farm ex post and simply might have been looking for a windfall damage award, the fact that the farmer insisted on
restoration at the beginning and the fact that the farm might have
been a business, as well as a residence, supports the view that the
farmer was not behaving opportunistically.' 56 In contrast, it is plau-

153. 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962), cert. denie4 375 U.S. 906 (1963).
154. Peevyhouse, 382 P.2d at 115-16.
155. Id; Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2, at 121-23.
156. On this point, Peevyhouse can be usefully contrasted (as it often is) with Groves v.
John Wunder Co., 286 N.W. 235 (Minn. 1939), another case involving a breach of a promise
to restore land. In that case, the likelihood of opportunistic behavior by the landowner was
greater there was no reason to think there was any subjective value over and above the
commercial value of the land; the landowner had not specifically insisted on the restoration
clause but may have simply been interested in shifting the risk of falling land values due to
the Depression; and apparently the landowner never did the restoration work, but simply
pocketed the money. See JOHN P. DAWSON ET AL, CASES AND COMMENT ON CONTRAcTs

17-18 (4th ed. 1982).
One might be able to infer opportunism on the part of the plaintiffs in both cases
from the fact that they sought damages rather than specific performance. See POSNER, supra
note 2, at 109, 120; cf. Albert L. Nichols & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Targeting Transfers
through Restrictions on Recipients, 72 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROc. 372, 374-76 (1982)
(arguing that in-kind transfers-which are analogous to specific performance-are sometimes
preferable to cash transfers because individuals may lie about their qualifications to get cash
but will not be willing to incur the costs associated with in-kind transfers). But according to
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sible that the mining company from the beginning never had any
intention of going through with its promise, though some have questioned this possibility."5 But if, as I have argued, the notion of opportunistic behavior should be extended beyond simple ex ante fraud,
the likelihood that the mining company was behaving
opportunistically ex post is even stronger. If at any point during performance the mining company had discovered the true cost of restoration, its incentive might have been not to tell the farmer immediately,
but to continue mining and postpone the bad news until the mining
company had reaped its full benefit. Perhaps the mining company
thought that by running up the cost of restoration, it could later be in
a better position to convince a court to be sympathetic to its (selfimposed) predicament, though this strategy might be a risky one.
3. The Negligence-Opportunism Tradeoff
It should be apparent that the most interesting and difficult class
of cases involves a conflict between the two traditions. When it appears that one contracting party is the least-cost-avoider and the other
is the most-probable-opportunist, the court must choose between deterring negligence and deterring opportunism.15 8 It cannot do both si-

Professor Judith Maute, who has done extensive research into the background of the
Peevyhouse case, one more innocent explanation of why the Peevyhouses did not seek
specific performance was that their lawyer was predominantly a tort lawyer used to working
on a contingency fee. Judith L. Maute, Peevyhouse v. Gardard Coal Co. Revisited: The
Ballad of Wllie and Lucille (forthcoming) (rhis decision by the lawyer might not have been
innocent, however, in fact, the lawyer may have been acting opportunistically toward his
clients).
157. See LON L. FULLER & MELVIN A. EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 218-19 (5th
ed. 1990) (quoting unpublished materials of Richard Danzig).
158. Goetz and Scott note a similar tradeoff in their article on mitigation rules, but there
is an important difference. They argue that in cases involving mitigation, an unconditional
right of specific performance would reduce "evasion costs" (opportunistic behavior by the
promisor), but increase the cost of "autonomous readjustment" (the costs arising from the fact
that the promisee may be the least-cost-mitigator). Thus, the need to deter opportunism
(evasion) must be balanced against the need to foster efficient mitigation (readjustment), or
deter negligent failures to mitigate. See Mitigation Principle, supra note 1, at 978. The
difference between their approach and mine is that they focus on balancing the opportunism
of a particularparty (the promisor) against the negligence of the other party (the promisee),
while I prefer to talk about balancing opportunism and negligence in general, recognizing that
either party may be opportunistic or negligent. The significance of this difference is that in
my view, specific performance is an inadequate solution not only because it may lead to
inefficient mitigation by the promisee, but also because it may lead to opportunism by the
promisee. Goetz and Scott do address the problem of promisee opportunism later in their
article, see id. at 982-83, but they do not explicitly address the same tradeoff I analyze in
the texL
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multaneously in a single case of this type. 59 The question is how
to handle these cases, the so-called "hard cases."
Professor Goldberg has termed a version of this conflict the
"Boomer problem," 16° after the famous case of Boomer v. Atlantic
Cenent Co. 6 ' In that case, residents sued a cement factory alleging
that pollution from the factory was a nuisance. Although the court
found a nuisance, it did not award the plaintiffs an injunction (the
typical relief), but limited their remedy to damages. 62 Law and
Economics scholars typically defend this decision because of the
potential for opportunistic behavior by the residents-holding out for
large payments for the entitlement to pollute-that an injunction
would create. 163 Goldberg argues that the damage remedy is also
flawed because it may fail to give the correct ex ante incentives to
future firms considering whether to build factories: they might fail to
take cost-justified "precautions" such as investigating alternative lowcost locations or negotiating with residents before building the
plant." 4 Thus, we have a conflict between potentially opportunistic
parties-the residents-and an arguably negligent but possibly opportunistic party-the factory. 6' Goldberg does not offer a definitive
resolution of the conflict, though he does suggest that "the likelihood
that an injunction would be granted to Boomer might be greater if
Atlantic simply built first and asked questions later [i.e. was opportunistic] rather than making a good-faith, but erroneous, projection of
the magnitude of the pollution problem [i.e. was negligent]."'6 I
will try to elaborate on Goldberg's insight-the reason the conflict

159. In the neat world of economic modeling, both would be deterred in the long run.
As in tort cases, punishing the least-cost-avoider would lead all future similarly situated
parties to take cost-justified precautions and avoid liability, so the contributorily negligent
(here opportunistic) party would also have an incentive to take cost-justified precautions to
minimize the losses he would have to bear. See Model of Precaution, supra note 5, at 5-11.
160. Victor P. Goldberg, Relational Exchange, Contract Law, and the Boomer Problem,
in GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 69-71, 126-27.
161. 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).
162. Id at 875.
163. Goldberg, supra note 160, at 69.
164, Id at 70.
165. Economists argue that the damage remedy leads to efficient ex ante incentives if
courts accurately measure damages; if courts underestimate damages, too many factories will
be built. See, e.g., POLINSKY, supra note 12, at 23. But efficient ex ante incentives also
require that the factory have perfect knowledge of the actual damages and the court's remedy. Underestimation by the factory of its expected losses could also lead to too many

factories being built.
166. Goldberg, supra note 160, at 71.
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occurs matters-in the remainder of this section.
To analyze the tradeoff between negligence and opportunism, we
must first return to the goal of the economic approach to law, which
is to minimize joint costs. I have already argued that opportunism is
more costly behavior than negligence. Therefore, deterring opportunism must take priority over deterring negligence; when one party is
the least-cost-avoider and the other is the most-probable-opportunist,
the latter should lose. But, as is often the case in law, matters are not
so simple.
In particular, we must consider that sometime annoying, sometime convenient, deus ex machina in Law and Economics-administrative costs. If the court system is institutionally better equipped to
detect and deter negligent behavior than opportunistic behavior, then
perhaps opportunism should be downplayed in contract doctrine, except in its more blatant varieties. Both Williamson 67 and
Posner,"" as well as traditional contract doctrine, can be read as
implicitly supporting this view. I want to argue here that this view is
wrong. Placing a priority on deterring opportunism, and making that
priority more explicit would in fact reduce administrative costs in
many cases.
One possible argument against giving priority to deterring opportunism is that opportunistic behavior is often difficult to detect. 69
Courts may not be able to determine with any certainty the parties'
expectations, contractual norms, or conventional morality; moreover,
opportunistic parties have every incentive to hide their indiscretions or
concoct post hoc justifications for this conduct. It is true that opportunistic behavior is often subtle, and that it often appears in cases that
either party (or both) could be acting opportunistically. Of course, if a
court cannot decide who the most-probable-opportunist is, but it can
decide who the least-cost-avoider is, it would make sense for the
court to place the liability on the least-cost-avoider because it is more
certain of that judgment. But there are also cases in which either
party (or both) could be characterized as negligent, while one party is
more likely opportunistic. In such a case, a court should place liability on the opportunistic party. 7 Punishing the behavior of which the
167. See, e.g., Williamson et al., supra note 49, at 258-59 (1975).
168. "The law of contracts ...
enforces only a limited subset of promises; many
morally objectionable breaches of promise give rise to no cause of action. This is because
the reach of the law is limited by the costs of administering it.- POSNER, supra note 2, at
262.
169. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
170. Goetz and Scott use such an argument to defend the common law rule that a
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court is more certain could even be viewed as a variation on the first
class of cases already discussed.17 '
One might assert that uncertainty about the most-probable-opportunist is more likely than uncertainty about the least-cost-avoider. But
this problem may be due simply to a lack of adequate (though easily
discoverable) information about the contracting parties' purposes,
expectations, and actions. If so, one would expect that if the focus of
the inquiry shifts to identifying opportunistic behavior, the information
presented to courts will improve." 2 In particular, if the courts in
interpreting any contract doctrine begin to pay more attention to the
parties' purposes in contracting, the commercial context of the deal,
and the reasons for nonperformance, opportunistic behavior should become more apparent.73 At the very least, courts are no worse
equipped to collect this kind of data than they are to measure the
precaution costs, expected accident costs, and activity levels required
under the least-cost-avoider tradition.
,Even if opportunism is difficult to detect in some cases, courts
can begin to identify situations in which the potential for opportunism
is great, and a rebuttable presumption that opportunism has occurred
is warranted. 74 For example, disputes involving a seller attempting
to justify nonperformance in the face of a market price increase, or a
buyer attempting to justify nonperformance in the face of a market

plaintiff need not mitigate so long as the defendant has not clearly and definitively repudiated
the contract. If there is a competitive market for substitutes, Goetz and Scott argue that
neither party is the least-cost-mitigator-either one can cover on the market. So the main
concern is to deter opportunism by the promisor, who may send ambiguous signals in the
hope of preserving the contract if the market turns favorable and absolving herself of mitigation responsibility should the market turn unfavorable. See Mitigation Principle, supra note 1,
at 989-90.
171. Another example is Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (1864), the famous
case of the two ships named "Peerless." There was no indication that either party was in a
better position to have known of the existence of the other ship. But there was a great
likelihood that the buyer was acting opportunistically in seeking to get out of the deal.
172. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
173. Another source of information about opportunism could be surveys of people in
various industries about what they view as the norms of behavior in that industry and what
would constitute unethical behavior. Professor Sen has argued for increased use of such data
by economists in determining preferences. See SEN, supra note 67, at 9, 71-72. Courts deciding contract disputes could allow such surveys to be introduced into evidence as "usages of
trade," see U.C.C. § 1-205(2) (1990), and "good faith," see id. § 2-103(I)(b). Alternatively,
courts could allow testimony by industry participants about "acceptable" behavior.
174. Cooter frames the issue as a balance between the Hobbes Theorem and the Coase
Theorem, that is between pessimism and optimism about the potential bargaining solutions.
See Cost of Cease, supra note 2, at 19.
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price decrease, should (and often do) alert judicial neurons to the
likelihood of opportunistic behavior and should presumptively cast
doubt on alternative explanations for the nonperformance. More generally, the presumption in favor of opportunistic behavior should be
stronger as the private benefits of such behavior increase and the
private costs decrease.
For instance, the greater the absolute level of the promisee's
sunk specific investments, the greater the potential private benefits of
opportunistic behavior to the promisor and the more likely the promisor is behaving opportunistically. More importantly, the greater the
relative difference between the promisee's sunk specific investments
and the promisor's sunk specific investments-the more vulnerable
the promisee is relative to the promisor-the more likely the promisor
will act opportunistically. The extreme case of this disparity is the
paradigmatic opportunism case discussed earlier:' 75 the promisee has
completely performed and is therefore completely vulnerable, while
the promisor has done nothing and has nothing at risk. 76 On the
other hand, if the promisor has suffered what Michael Wachter and I
have elsewhere termed a "sunk cost loss,""7 that is a loss of specific assets resulting from some regret contingency, the inference of
promisor opportunism as opposed to reasonable adjustment is weaker
(though not necessarily absent).' 78 The link between sunk investments and the potential for opportunism is the feature that has led
many scholars to identify concerns about opportunism with long-term
or relational contracts, which I have discussed previously.'79
In addition, the private costs of opportunistic behavior are lower-and opportunistic behavior is therefore more likely-in situations
where extralegal enforcement mechanisms are weaker. 8 ' The private

175. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
176. A sunk investment need not be a physical investment, however. A contractual
commitment itself is a form of sunk investment because it represents a commitment to forego
certain other opportunities. See Burton, supra note 78, at 375-76.
177. See Michael L. Wachter & George M. Cohen, The Law and Economics of CollectiveBargaining: An Introduction and Application to the Problems of Subcontracting, Partial
Closure, and Relocation, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1378-79 (1988).
178. This idea underlies some of the impossibility cases in which the party seeking
excuse has suffered some loss. For example, a farmer whose crops are destroyed by disease
will generally be excused from a contract for crops specified to come from a particular location. See U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 9 (1990).
179. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
180. See David Charney, Nonlegal Sanction in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L.
REV. 373 (1990).
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costs associated with developing a reputation as an opportunist might,
for example, deter opportunism regardless of the legal treatment.'
Moreover, the market for substitute performances might be sufficiently
"thick" ex post that any attempt to behave opportunistically will simply result in the other party going elsewhere.12 Or contracting parties might use such self-help enforcement devices as deposits or
bonds to deter opportunism.' But in many cases, these private enforcement mechanisms will be relatively ineffective. Information about
reputation might be very costly to collect and transmit, especially if
the victim of opportunistic behavior is not a repeat player in the
promisor's market.' The substitute market will often be "thin," especially as performance becomes more specialized. And private contracting devices to curb opportunism might be too costly or too manipulable. Because of uncertainty and complexity, contracting parties
often use vague and incomplete contract terms, thus making it possible for their contracting partners to be opportunistic." 5 Moreover,
even if the parties can anticipate some potential opportunism in advance, "behavioral uncertainty" prevents parties from foreseeing all
the ways the contract can potentially be used to allow one party to
86
escape from her expected responsibilities.
As courts begin lowering the potential private benefits and increasing the private costs of investing in opportunistic behavior (by
increasing the likelihood that such behavior will be detected and
punished), economic theory predicts that the amount of such behavior
will decrease. The efficacy of court regulation of opportunism will
depend not only on the available information, but also on the responsiveness of contracting parties to the legal rules created. To deter
undesirable behavior, legal rules must be known to the parties. Contracting parties are more likely to know about rules punishing or forgiving opportunism-and what it takes to comply with those
rules-than about rules punishing or forgiving negligence. Not only

181. See, e.g., Benjamin Klein, Transaction Cost Determinants of "Unfair" Contractual
Arrangements, 70 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERs & PROC. 356, 358-59, 361 (1980).
182. See Muds, supra note 50, at 522-23.
183. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
184. Klein recognizes this problem in the franchise context. He notes that although a
franchisor's interest in the value of its brand name will often deter franchisor opportunism,
"this protective mechanism is limited by the relative importance of new franchise sales
compared to the continuing franchising operation, that is, by. the 'maturity' of the franchise
chain." Klein, supra note 181, at 360.
185. See Mitigation Principle, supra note 1, at 968 n.5.
186. See ECONOMIC INSTrrTUnoNs, supra note 49, at 58-59.
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are rules concerning opportunism more likely to coincide with a
layperson's sense of justice and injustice, but because opportunistic
behavior is engaged in deliberately and often ex post, it is more
likely that a person contemplating such behavior will be able to consuit with legal counsel beforehand."8 7 It is likely, therefore, that
rules regulating opportunism will have a greater deterrent effect than
rules regulating negligence."tr One possible exception is contract
disputes involving a negligent contracting party, who is a "repeat
player" in the market, and an individual making a "one-shot transaction," who acts opportunistically. In such a case, there is an argument
for deterring the negligent party, because deterrence is likely to be
effective and the failure to deter the opportunistic individual may
have relatively small consequences.189
It is of course possible that fashioning contract rules as incentives to deter opportunism will have the exact opposite effect. If
opportunism becomes more prominent in contract doctrine, parties
may respond simply by becoming more opportunistic, for example, by
investing even more in obfuscating their purposes and actions. One
may doubt the likely cost-effectiveness of such a strategy. But it is
also important to recognize that legal rules do not affect only
individuals' self-interest motivations. Ifcontract law deems opportunistic behavior unlawful, then at least some people who would other-

187. Cf. Richard Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the Industrialization of the
Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 249, 282 (1975) (arguing that a modem rationale for the Hadley rule
might focus on its effect on a seller at the time of deciding whether or not to breach, and
not at the time of 6ontracting, because a seller will more likely consult a lawyer at the latter
time, and therefore will more likely be affected by the legal rule).
188. Some scholars have expressed skepticism about the deterrent effect of negligence
law in tort. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away With Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 555,
560 (1985).
189. A variation on this argument could be used to criticize the good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amendment. Courts face a conflict between the desire
to punish "opportunistic" criminals and to deter "negligent" police officers that is similar to
the conflict within contract law. Deterrence of negligent police behavior through application of
the exclusionary rule might be more effective than deterrence of negligent contracting behavior because the police are repeat players who are likely to be aware of the legal requirements. On the other hand, criminals may also be repeat players. Of course, there are other
important economic reasons why we might be more likely to punish negligent police behavior
over opportunistic criminal behavior in the criminal context than in the contractual context; in
particular the spillover costs of failing to deter police misconduct may be substantial. See
generally Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Comment, The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An
Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1016, 1054 (1987)
(noting that police officers who knowingly conduct illegal searches will not be deterred by
education and, therefore, need to be deterred by subjection to punishment).
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wise act opportunistically will refrain from such behavior. This is not
because opportunistic behavior is now more costly to them, but because it is now legally defined as "wrongful" behavior.1 That is,
law can change people's "social preferences," or sense of "social
responsibility" or "commitment," which influence behavior as much as
the pursuit of personal welfare does. 9 The combination of selfinterest and social responsibility should lead to a reduction in opportunistic behavior and a corresponding increase in trust among contracting parties.
In sum, in most cases, the administrative costs of discovering
and deterring opportunistic behavior are not so high as to disturb my
initial assertion that opportunism should generally take priority over
negligence in contract cases in which the two goals conflict.
II.

THE THEORY APPLIED

To make the points in the previous section more concrete, I will
apply the insights from the expanded, fault-based theory of contract
law to analyze two cases in seemingly unrelated areas of contract
law: substantial performance and the statute of frauds. The goal here
is a modest one: to show that the combined negligence-opportunism
model is a useful tool both for explaining and criticizing a wide
variety of contract doctrines, and for suggesting new avenues for
research and reform.
A.

Jacob & Youngs v. Kent

Perhaps the case that best epitomizes the negligence-opportunism
tradeoff in contract law is the famous case of Jacob & Youngs, Inc.
v. Kent." Jacob & Youngs built a "country residence" for Kent, a
successful New York lawyer,193 for $77,000, of which Kent paid all
but around $3500. One of the contract specifications provided: "All
wrought-iron pipe must be well galvanized, lap welded pipe of the
grade known as 'standard pipe' of Reading manufacture." Nine
months after the house was completed, Kent learned that some of the
pipe used was not Reading pipe, but wrought iron pipe made by
other manufacturers, including Cohoes. Kent then ordered the pipe
190. See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990).
191. See SEN, supra note 67, at 65-70, 91-97.
192. 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921).

193. This fact does not appear in the opinion, but is mentioned in RICHARD DANZIG,
THE CAPABILITY PROBLEM IN CONTRACT LAW 120 (1978).
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replaced, even though much of it was already encased within the
walls of the house. Jacob & Youngs refused to replace the pipe, Kent
refused to make the final payment, and Jacob & Youngs sued. The
New York Court of Appeals, speaking through Judge Cardozo, allowed Jacob & Youngs to recover the full remaining payment, despite
its acknowledged breach. Cardozo's reasoning-in different terminology, of course-is essentially that the builder was merely negligent in
breaching while the homeowner was potentially opportunistic in insisting on the letter of the contract; therefore, the homeowner lost.
Cardozo's approach is fully consonant with the model outlined here.
After stating the facts, Cardozo begins the opinion by stressing
that "the omission of the prescribed brand of pipe was neither fraudulent nor willful. It was the result of the oversight and inattention of
the [builder's] subcontractor ....
Even the [homeowner's] architect,
though he inspected the pipe upon arrival, failed to notice the discrepancy."1 94 Cardozo's starting point is one of this article's main
themes: the reason the breach occurs matters. Despite Cardozo's hint
of contributory negligence by the homeowner through his architect,
Cardozo's conclusion (in the terms developed here) is that the contractor was the ex ante least-cost-avoider of the regret contingency,
but was not acting opportunistically. Although the contractor's superintendent had reminded the subcontractor's foreman about the Reading
pipe specification at the time of the first delivery of pipe, and had
examined this first delivery to see that it was Reading pipe,' the
contractor could have taken further precautions regarding subsequent
deliveries, such as monitoring more closely the subcontractor's employee responsible for ordering the pipe, inspecting the pipe upon
arrival more carefully, and seeking prior approval of the homeowner
for making substitutions. 96

194. Jacob & Youngs, 129 N.E. at 890.
195. Id at 892 (McLaughlin, J., dissenting).
196. One could argue that the contractor was not negligent in the sense that the homeowner suffered no damages from the substitution and therefore no precautions were necessary.
In my view, however, the negligence label makes sense for several reasons. First, ex ante the
precautions were arguably cost-effective because the cost of precautions was relatively low
and there was some probability-however slight-that the homeowner had a special preference
for Reading pipe and would suffer large damages if a different brand were substituted. Put
another way, even if there are no actual losses ex post, we might prefer the contractor next
time around to be more careful, even if only by using different contract language or by
checking with the homeowner before making substitutions. Imposing liability on the contractor
would thus make contract law more like ex ante regulation (e.g., fining a driver for not
wearing a seat belt); it would also make contract liability 'strict" in the sense that actual loss
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On the other hand, there was no evidence that the contractor
knew of a special reason the homeowner had for wanting Reading
pipe and ignored his wishes for the sake of convenience. Nor was
there evidence that the contractor was substituting non-Reading pipe
for the purpose of cutting comers and taking advantage of either the
homeowner's relative lack of knowledge about pipes or a court's
potential hesitation to apply the contract strictly, or for any other
"guileful" purpose. Cardozo found instead that the installed pipe was
"the same in quality, in appearance, in market value, and in cost as
the brand stated in the contract."1 97 In Cardozo's view, this fact differentiated the case from Schultze v. Goodstein,19 in which the
court found that the contractor had "willfully and intentionally used
inferior and less expensive ['earthen' 11/2 inch pipe] in the place of
[the iron 2 inch pipe] agreed upon."' 99 Although the dissent in Jacob & Youngs concluded that the contractor's failure to perform "was
either intentional or due to gross neglect which ... amounted to the
same thing," ' ° it offered no evidence in support of this interpretation other than the fact that Reading pipe comprised only 1000 feet
out of the 2000 to 2500 feet of pipe required. It is difficult to see
how the mere quantity of the deviation-regardless of the quality-supports an inference of opportunism on the part of the contrac201
tor.
need not be proved rather than in the tort sense that actual loss must always be compensated. Second, the contractor should have known that the potential for homeowner opportunism could have resulted in losses to the contractor from tearing out the nonconforming pipe
and replacing it with Reading had the court interpreted the contract strictly and ruled in
Kent's favor. In this sense, too, the contractor was negligent: it could easily have avoided the
whole dispute and its attendant costs, including administrative costs.

197. let at 890.
198. 73 N.E. 21 (N.Y. 1905).
199. L. at 23. It is true that in upholding the exclusion of expert testimony by a
plumber, the Schultze court also says, more broadly: "When the owner stipulated for iron
pipe, he had the right to iron pipe, regardless of whether some other kind, according to the
opinion of the contractor or of experts, would do as well.- Id; Jacob & Youngs, 129 N.E. at
892 (McLaughlin, J., dissenting). But this statement does not detract from the fact that the
evidence in Schultze suggested a material difference (in fact, the homeowner had counterclaimed for repair costs), and therefore potential opportunistic behavior (skimping) by the
contractor. Moreover, there was apparently no plausible story that the contractor did not know
of the deviation, as there was in Jacob & Youngs.
200. Jacob & Youngs, 129 N.E. at 892 (McLaughlin, J., dissenting).
201. If the quality deviation per foot is close to zero, then 1000 times zero is still zero.
Perhaps the mere quantity could make a difference if it tended to suggest that the contractor
must have known of the substitution; that is, if so much non-Reading pipe was being used,
the contractor at some point would have noticed, and so its claim that the substitution was
inadvertent is implausible. I do not think that is what the dissent means, but in any event I
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In contrast, the facts do support a fairly strong inference that the
homeowner was acting opportunistically ex post in insisting on carrying out the letter of the contract. In fact, the case bears a striking
resemblance to the paradigmatic opportunism case discussed earlier.2° The contractor was in a relatively vulnerable position, having
completed its performance before payment was made. Although the
contractor had protected itself against homeowner opportunism to
some degree by insisting on progress payments, the final payment
outstanding was still a sizeable sum by 1921 standards. Nor were the
extralegal enforcement mechanisms sufficient to check any potential
homeowner opportunism. The homeowner was a one-shot contractor;
thus, developing a reputation as an opportunist would not likely hurt
him in the marketplace. 3 Moreover, the market for substitute performance was not thick, because the contractor had (literally) "sunk"
specific assets into the project, thereby effecting a "fundamental transformation": tearing out the old embedded pipe would have been very
costly. Cardozo recognized this problem, distinguishing between cases
in which "the thing upon which labor has been expended is incapable
of surrender" and those in which "the subject-matter, if defective, is
in shape to be returned. ' °
Finally, the chances that the homeowner had any real interest in
Reading pipe as opposed to the pipe that was supplied were very
slight. Cardozo starts from the proposition that just as the reason for
the promisor's nonperformance matters, so does the promisee's reason
for proposing the relevant contractual provision. 5 But he notes that

do not think it is a reasonable presumption in this case. The contractor had already checked
once that Reading pipe was being used, and probably saw no reason to check again. And
absent careful checking, the substitution would not easily have been noticed.
202. See supra notes 46 & 176 and accompanying text.
203. Reputation would have a much greater effect on Jacob & Youngs, a repeat player
in a market that often uses word of mouth recommendations. And Kent, an influential lawyer,
was more likely to have an influence on Jacob & Youngs' business by badmouthing it than
the typical homeowner. These facts further support putting liability on Kent, because Jacob &
Youngs would be deterred from future negligent behavior even absent legal sanction.
204. Jacob & Youngs, 129 N.E. at 890-91. In his statement of the facts, Cardozo
stressed that the pipe "was then encased within the walls except in a few places where it
had to be exposed. Obedience to the order meant more than the substitution of other pipe. It
meant the demolition at great expense of substantial parts of the completed structure." Id at
890. The dissent argued that Jacob & Youngs had not proved this expense. Id at 892
(McLaughlin, J., dissenting).
205. In Cardozo's words, "We must weigh the purpose to be served, the desire to be
gratified, the excuse for deviation from the letter, the cruelty of enforced adherence." Id at
891.
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"[i]ntention not otherwise revealed may be presumed to hold in contemplation the reasonable and probable. If something else is in view,
it must not be left to implication. "2"6 The "reasonable and probable"
purpose of requiring Reading pipe was to guarantee pipe of a certain
functional quality, rather than to guarantee a particular brand. 0 7
This purpose was satisfied. °8 If this had been a case involving
"fields of art" as opposed to products "of mere utility," 2 ' there
might have been some subjective, stylistic purpose that was not satisfied by the substitute performance. 210 But this was not the case with
pipe. Nor was it likely that the homeowner had any special interest in
the Reading company, such as a family or personal connection. 211 If
the homeowner had such an interest, he (or the personal connection)

206. Id. It is crucial to note that for Cardozo (and me), "revealed preference" does not
mean the same thing that it does to an economist. To an economist, preferences are "revealed" solely by choices made in the market and are not to be questioned. In discussing
Jac9 b & Youngs, an economist might therefore argue (as the dissent does) that Kent had
revealed his preference for Reading pipe by specifying it. To Cardozo-and the rest of us
who do not live in the bizarre world imagined by neoclassical economists-one's actions are
not synonymous with one's preferences. See SEN, supra note 67, at 1-10.
207. This interpretation is supported by one of the specifications, which is quoted in
DANzIG, supra note 193, at 111: "Where any particular brand of manufactured article is
specified, it is to be considered as a standard. Contractors desiring to use another shall first
make application in writing to the Architect stating the difference in cost and obtain their
written approval of the change." Although Jacob & Youngs did not comply with this specification in full, it does suggest what the parties' intentions were.
208. Cf. Spence v. Ham, 57 N.E. 412 (N.Y. 1900). In this case, relied on by both
Cardozo and the dissent, the court denied the contractor's claim of substantial performance.
But although some commentators claim that this case stands for "a very restricted doctrine of
substantial performance, under which only very trivial omissions could be excused," Levin &
McDowell, supra note 3, at 68, this interpretation seems overly cramped. In fact, the case is
reasonably distinguishable from Jacob & Youngs. The Spence court concluded that the
contractor's "failure to have girders of certain length and properly placed, and the failure to
place wooden partition on a brick wall in basement, ... were structural defects, which
affected the solidity of the building, and tended to defeat the object of the contract." Spence,
57 N.E. at 414 (emphasis added).
209. Jacob & Youngs, 129 N.E. at 891.
210. For example, "[i]f the owner prefers a plain and simple Doric column, and has so
provided in the agreement, the contractor has no right to put in its place the more costly and
elegant Corinthian." Id. at 893 (McLaughlin, J., dissenting) (quoting Smith v. Brady, 17 N.Y.
173, 186 (1858)).
211. In subsequent research on the case, Richard Danzig found no evidence of any
professional or financial connection between Kent and the Reading Company. See DANZIG,
supra note 193, at 120. Although the possibility of such a connection is mentioned as at
least a hypothetical variation on Jacob & Youngs by many commentators, I have not been
able to find any appellate case that involves an idiosyncratic contracting party with some
undisclosed reason for wanting a particular brand of some product who refuses to perform
when another equivalent brand is substituted and replacement is difficult.
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would likely have been more aggressive about monitoring, he would
have ordered the pipe himself, or-as the idiosyncratic party-would
have used "apt and certain words" to make his meaning clearer.2" 2
Thus, the likelihood was strong that the homeowner was acting
opportunistically, insisting on Reading pipe even though he did not
really care' what brand of pipe he got, so long as it was "wrought
iron pipe. 2
That is not to say that the homeowner was blatantly opportunistic-extortionate. He probably did not just happen to notice the discrepancy and decide that money in his pocket is always better than
money in the contractor's pocket; rather he most likely was unhappy
with some other aspect of Jacob & Youngs' work and used the Reading pipe specification as a means of expressing this dissatisfaction.21 4 If the contractor had breached any other part of the agreement, however, the homeowner could have either refused to make the
final payment or litigated on that ground. 15 Absent such a claim or
any evidence of damage, however, there is nothing to lend any validity to the homeowner's gripes. The homeowner's potential opportunism was subtle, but it was opportunism nonetheless. The dissent,
however, shows no concern at all with the homeowner's motive:
"What his reason was for requiring this kind of pipe is of no impor-

212. Jacob & Youngs, 129 N.E. at 891. Kent was "idiosyncratic" in the sense that a
"typical" homeowner would not have cared which brand of pipe was used as long as the
quality was the same. Knowing this, Kent could have added language such as, "No other
brand of pipe will be considered acceptable." Such language would be, of course, superfluous
where "fields of art" .or substitutes of inferior quality are concerned, but in this case, Cardozo
was suggesting that a stronger signal must be sent than simply naming "Reading." On the
other hand, one must use caution in making this type of argument-essentially that Kent was
the least-cost-avoider with respect to clarifying the contract terms-because Jacob & Youngs
could also fairly easily have stipulated in the contract that Reading pipe is required and no
steel pipe may be substituted. If Kent is viewed as the least-cost-avoider, the negligenceopportunism tradeoff dissolves and the case becomes an "easy" Type 2 case like Peevyhouse.
See supra part ll.B.2.
213. According to Professor Danzig, the brand name Reading was probably specified to
insure that wrought iron pipe was used as opposed to steel pipe, which was thought to be
inferior in durability and maintenance. See DANZIG, supra note 193, at 121. In particular, "it
was the normal trade practice to assure wrought iron pipe quality by naming a manufacturer.
In contemporary trade bulletins put out by . . . Reading, prospective buyers were cautioned
that some steel pipe manufacturers used iron pipe and often sold under misleading names like
'wrought pipe.'" IL at 122.
214. See id at 123.
215. Evidently, Jacob & Youngs admitted in its complaint that "minor details" remained
to be completed and that Kent would not be obligated to make the final payment until these
defaults were cured. See id at 124. Jacob & Youngs apparently made no objection to this
perfectly reasonable use of self-help by Kent.
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tance. He wanted that and was entitled to it. It may have been a
mere whim on his part, but even so, he had a right to this kind of
pipe. ' 6 But as Cardozo's intuition and the analysis of this paper
shows, the homeowner's insistence on only Reading pipe may have
been much more objectionable than a "mere whim."
Jacob & Youngs thus presents a classic case of the negligenceopportunism tradeoff.2 7 The court had to choose between deterring
the contractor's negligence in allowing nonconforming pipe to be
used, and the homeowner's potential opportunism.in insisting on strict
performance when he had no real interest in it. This choice parallels
Professor Goldberg's "Boomer problem": the court could either award
the injunction and deter the factory's negligence in choosing an unsuitable location, or award damages and deter the potential opportunism of the residents who could hold out for high sums and force the
plant to close. In both cases, the court opted for deterring ex post
opportunism by denying injunctive relief to the homeowner and the
residents.2 18
Jacob & Youngs has not met with universal approval, however.
Professor Alan Schwartz, an influential Law and Economics scholar,
has recently criticized the case on the ground that the "result seemed
precluded by the contract, which . . . gave [the homeowner] the power to choose between the cost of completion and diminution in value
damage measures, but the court reserved this power for itself." 19

216. Jacob & Youngs, 129 N.E. at 892 (McLaughlin, L, dissenting).
217. Professors Levin and McDowell characterize Jacob & Youngs as supporting their

theory that contract law reflects a balance between voluntariness and fairness. They argue that
the scope of voluntarily assumed contractual obligations is determined by fairness: only if
"the parties [would] have agreed to the performance if they had possessed the foresight to
see that a deviation might occur," would the terms be strictly enforced. Levin & McDowell,
supra note 3, at 70. Although there are important similarities between this theory and mine,

they are not identical.
218. Goldberg, supra note 160, at 69.
219. Alan Schwartz, The Myth that Promisees Prefer Supracompensatory Remedies: An
Analysis of Contractingfor Damage Measures, 100 YALE LJ. 369, 406 (1990). The clause
that Professor Schwartz refers to is the following:

Any work furnished by the Contractor, the material or workmanship of
which is defective or which is not fully in accordance with the drawings and
specifications, in every respect, will be rejected and is to be immediately torn
down, removed and remade or replaced in accordance with the drawings and spedfications, whenever discovered ....
The Owner will have the option at all times
to allow the defective or improper work to stand and to receive from the Contrac-

tor a sum of money equivalent to the difference in value of the work as performed and as herein specified.
ScoTr & LESLIE, supra note 104, at 78. The clause is not mentioned at all in the Jacob &
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This argument comes at the end of a carefully argued and provocative
article, whose main thesis is that "parties will choose appropriate
remedies when left to their own devices,"" 0 and that therefore
"courts should enforce all liquidated damage and specific performance
clauses."221 Jacob & Youngs, as well as other cases refusing to enforce contract remedy terms strictly, are guilty of what Schwartz refers to as "court centeredness," which "holds that courts should ensure that performance under a fair reading of a contract's terms
would not contradict the parties' 'deeper' intentions and fairness." 2"
Throwing down the gauntlet, Schwartz concludes his article by asking
"whether defenders of court centeredness can show how their commitment to it is reconcilable with Contract Law's parallel commitment to
one of these foundational comparty autonomy. Absent this showing,
2
mitments must be abandoned. 2
It is difficult to imagine a position more at odds with the thesis
of this article, and so I will attempt to take up Professor Schwartz's
challenge. The purpose of the Jacob & Youngs contract clause cited
by Schwartz was apparently to squelch any temptation by the contractor to substitute inferior components and to protect the homeowner
against any deviations that might cause damage that would be difficult to measure. If this purpose would in fact be served by enforcing
the contract strictly in this case, there could be little objection. The
problem is that there is a chance-in my view, a strong probability-that this purpose would not be served by enforcing the clause,
because the contractor breached unintentionally, the homeowner acted
opportunistically, and there were no damages.
Schwartz is aware of the dangers of ex post promisee opportunism, but he seeks to minimize these dangers primarily by invoking

Youngs opinion, though in a brief per curiam opinion denying the defendant's motion for
reargument, the court stated that it:
did not overlook the specification which provides that defective work shall be
replaced. The promise to replace, like the promise to install, is to be viewed, not
as a condition, but as independent and collateral, when the defect is trivial and
innocent. The law does not nullify the covenant, but restricts the remedy to damages.
Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 130 N.E. 933, 933 (N.Y. 1921).
220. Schwartz, supra note 219, at 407.
221. Id. at 405.
222. Id at 406. This seems somewhat similar to Galanter's concept of "legal centralism."
See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
223. Id at 407. This last statement resembles the "fundamental contradiction" position-that the negligence and opportunism traditions cannot be usefully combined-which I
considered and rejected earlier. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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arguments that we have discussed previously. Although he disperses
these arguments throughout the article, and does not specifically apply
them to Jacob & Youngs, he clearly intends his analysis to have
broader application than the specific doctrines he critiques. 4 First,
Schwartz argues that ex post opportunism rarely occurs, because various extralegal sanctions sufficiently deter it: thick substitute markets
render opportunistic threats empty; 225 parties contemplating opportunistic behavior fear developing bad reputations; 6 and contracting
parties use "bonding mechanisms" to make opportunism unprofitable.227 But effective as these mechanisms are in deterring opportunism generally, it requires no small leap to conclude that they are so
effective at deterring opportunism that courts need not worry about it
ever occurring."' And we have already seen how, at least in Jacob
& Youngs, these mechanisms would not have successfully deterred an
opportunistic homeowner.
Second, Schwartz argues that even if opportunism can occur,
courts cannot distinguish opportunism from legitimate behavior.229 I
have already addressed the issue of administrative cost in general. In

224. Id at 391 n.45 (arguing that the argument can be extended to cost of completion
damages). Presumably, Schwartz would agree with the conclusion of this article (though not
necessarily the reasoning) that the Peevyhouse case was wrongly decided.
225. Ma at 388-89.
226. Ma at 393 (inducing breach can create reputational losses).
227. Id. at 392 n.48.
228. Schwartz at one point seems to take the extreme position that opportunism is
unlikely to exist, even if it is feasible. He argues with respect to contracting for specific
performance that "exploitation could occur only when a promisee who contracted for the right
for specific relief later discovered that such relief was unnecessary but chose to demand it to
extort a large payment." Id at 388-89. Although this seems to describe Jacob & Youngs,
Schwartz abruptly concludes: "This apparently would seldom happen." Id at 389. This
statement precedes what Schwartz evidently considers to be a separate argument, namely that
opportunism is not feasible in any event because effective substitutes usually exist. Schwartz
then cites two pieces of evidence in support of his conclusion that promisee opportunism is
rare: (1) specific performance is seldom sought in jurisdictions where it is easier to get; and
(2) specific relief is almost never denied on the ground that the promisee had ani adequate
alternative remedy. See id The first piece of evidence might be explained by the fact that
the jurisdictions with more liberal specific performance laws police ex post promisee opportunism through other doctrines. The second piece of evidence seems to say nothing about the
potential for opportunism, because, as Schwartz earlier states and later recognizes, see id at
396 n.54 (noting that a case for punitive damages can be made in thin markets), opportunism
can occur only where there is no adequate*alternative remedy.
229. See id at 387 ("Courts .. . cannot easily know when a clause is supracompensatory."). This concern with the difficulties courts face in trying to recognize opportunism is
also expressed by Danzig, who refers to these difficulties as "capability problems." See
DANZIG, supra note 193, at 127-28.
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Jacob & Youngs, there did not seem to be anything particularly complex about the contract. True, the purpose of the Reading pipe requirement, the reason for the breach, and Kent's motive were all
difficult factual questions, but courts constantly deal with those types
of questions. Courts certainly make mistakes, but even in the cases
that Schwartz critiques, it does not seem that it would be so difficult
to explain the purposes of the contract clauses at issue, especially
when these clauses were most likely drafted with the help of lawyers.23 Apparently, though Schwartz fears court centeredness, what
he preaches is court impotence.
Third, Schwartz seems to suggest that even if opportunism can
occur, and courts can recognize it, deterring negligence should take
priority over deterring opportunism. He states that "the willingness of
courts to attempt to rescue parties from bad deals reduces the parties'
incentives to write good contracts originally., 231 There are two
problems with this statement. It assumes that there is such a thing as
a "good" contract that will deter all opportunistic behavior; but there
232
is no such contract because there is no limit to opportunism.
Schwartz's statement also assumes that it is always efficient for parties to write better contracts. However, this ignores the transaction
costs of writing such contracts and the opportunity costs of leaving
opportunism undeterred. An advocate of an increased role of the
230. See Schwartz, supra note 219, at 384-86 (criticizing two cases striking down liquidated damage clauses as unlawful penalties). Schwartz attributes court error in one opinion
written by Judge Posner to his failure to recognize the liquidated damage provision as an
efficient take-or-pay clause. According to Schwartz, "Judge Posner's difficulty probably
stemmed from the fact that he had made no study of liquidated damage clauses generally and
neither party mentioned take-or-pay clauses during the case. That courts and lawyers seldom
are industry experts is the reason why courts generally do not review contract clauses." I at
386 n.33. Without discussing the merits of Posner's decision, I find it somewhat surprising
that a firm's lawyers, who probably helped draft the provision at issue, could not explain in
simple terms to a highly intelligent judge what the parties were attempting to accomplish by
using a particular contract clause. It is common for lawyers to offer testimony about the
intended meaning of contract terms they helped to draft. See, e.g., Lamborn v. Dittmer, 873
F.2d 522 (2d Cir. 1989); United Food & Commercial Workers Health & Welfare Fund v.
Darwin Lynch Adm'rs, Inc., 781 F. Supp 1067, 1069-71 (M.D. Pa. 1991). At least in such
cases, one cannot claim that the reason for a particular preference is not knowable. This is
not a situation like the "business judgment rule" in corporate law, under which courts decline
to second-guess management decisions because they lack the expertise. Shoddy lawyering
should be condemned for what it is.
231. Schwartz, supra note 219, at 370.
232. See ECONOMIC INsTITLUTONS, supra note 49, at 58, 66; cf. SEN, supra note 67, at
65 (noting that although it is sometimes possible for, the players in a prisoner's dilemma
game to contract against opportunistic behavior-confession-such a contract may be difficult
to devise and conceivably impossible to enforce under certain circumstances.").
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courts in deterring opportunism could flip Schwartz's statement and
argue that the unwillingness of the courts to rescue parties from bad
deals increases transaction costs by forcing parties to write substantially more detailed contracts to cover more remote contingencies, and
to invest in other costly self-protection devices, thereby reducing the
level of trust in the other side and poisoning the relationship from the
outset 3 3-all in the hopeless quest to eliminate opportunism. Thus,
rules that direct courts to ignore the parties' "deeper intentions" may
lead to costly court error just as much as rules that advocate excessive "intervention."
Finally, Schwartz argues that other contract doctrines-good
faith2 and unconscionability235 can handle any problem of opportunism that may arise. Shunting off the problem onto other doctrines does not resolve it, however. Schwartz gives no hint of how
these other doctrines would handle opportunistic behavior, though one
suspects that Schwartz would restrict the application of these doctrines
to fraudulent or other blatant abuses.236 In sum, Jacob & Youngs
provides an excellent example of how one can be simultaneously
committed to "court centeredness" and "party autonomy"; it successfully navigates the negligence-opportunism tradeoff.
B.

Barrett Builders v. Miller

A seemingly unrelated area of contract law into which the negligence-opportunism tradeoff can offer insight is the statute of frauds,
which in its various guises denies enforcement to certain categories of
contracts not put into writing. An interesting recent case that starkly
presents the tradeoff and nicely parallels Jacob & Youngs is Barrett
Builders v. Miller,"37 written by Chief Justice Peters of the Connecticut Supreme Court, formerly a professor of Contracts at Yale. The
particular version of the statute of frauds at issue in Barrett Builders
and the three companion cases decided the same day238 is contained

233. Cf Schwartz, supra note 219, at 397 (arguing that parties would
bargain to shift attorneys' fees because "a party that requests a legal fee clause
to signal that it would rather sue than work disputes out privately. This is a
send"). Prenuptial agreements are another example of this problem.
234. See id at 371 n.5, 393.
235. See id at 384 n.26, 386 n.34.
236. Cf id at 396 n.54 (noting as "thoughtful" an article suggesting
damages would be appropriate in cases of "outrageous producer behavior").
237. 576 A.2d 455 (Conn. 1990).
238. A. Secondino & Son, Inc. v. LoRicco, 576 A.2d 464 (Conn. 1990)
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in Connecticut's Home Improvement Act.239
The facts of Barrett Builders are straightforward. Barrett Builders
and Rhoda Miller entered into a signed written agreement for the
acquisition and installation of kitchen cabinets, a counter top,
"underlayment" for the floor, and a door, as well as for the repairing,
refinishing, and painting of the ceiling in Miller's home.2' The
writing did not specify any particular style, size, or brand of cabinet.
The price was $9783 to be paid in three equal installments: a down
payment, a payment upon installation of the cabinets, and a final payment upon completion of the job.24' Miller made the down payment
and Barrett Builders started working. After Barrett Builders installed
the cabinets, Miller issued a check for the second installment, but
later stopped payment, claiming "that the cabinets installed by
[Barrett] were inferior to the samples provided at the time of the
contract negotiation. "242
' Miller alleged that she was supposed to get
"solid core" cabinets, but instead got "hollow core" cabinets.243
Barrett sued for the amount of the last two installments, claiming that
by the time Miller stopped payment, it had substantially completed
the required work. Miller responded that the written agreement did
not satisfy the requirements of the Connecticut statute and so the
contract was unenforceable. The Connecticut Supreme Court agreed.
The particular issue addressed by the Barrett Builders court was
whether a home improvement contractor that has not satisfied the
Home Improvement Act statute of frauds can nevertheless recover on
a theory of quasi-contract, unjust enrichment, or restitution for the
value of the work performed. Several years earlier in Caulkins v.

Liljedahl Bros. v. Grigsby, 576 A.2d 149 (Conn. 1990) (Peters, CJ.); Sidney v. DeVries, 575

A.2d 228 (Conn. 1990) (per curiam).
239. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-429(a) (West 1988). This section states:
No home improvement contract shall be valid or enforceable against an owner
unless it: (1) is in writing, (2) is signed by the owner and the contractor, (3) contains the entire agreement between the owner and the contractor, (4) contains the
date of the transaction, (5) contains the name and address of the contractor, (6)
contains a notice of the owner's cancellation rights in accordance with the provisions of chapter 740, (7) contains a starting date and completion date, and (8) is
entered into by a registered salesman or registered contractor. Each change in the
terms and conditions of a contract shall be in writing and shall be signed by the
owner and contractor.

Idl
240.
241.
242.
243.

See Barrett Builders, 576 A.2d at 456 n.2.
Id.
Id at 457.
ld at 459-60.
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Petrillo,' the court had held that it would not recognize an exception to the Home Improvement Act statute of frauds for contractors
that had fully performed. Barrett Builders extended this holding to
deny an exception based on restitution.
The parallels between Barrett Builders and Jacob & Youngs are
apparent. In both cases there was a dispute between a homeowner and
a contractor over the quality of the work done after the contractor
performed, but before the homeowner paid. In both cases, the contractor claimed to have performed substantially. In both cases the contractor used progress payments to protect itself against excessive vulnerability, but was still in a relatively vulnerable position at the time of
the suit. There are of course important factual differences, which will
be discussed below. Yet it is crucial to recognize at the outset that in
the eyes of traditional contract doctrine, these two cases are completely different. The economic analysis, however, is largely the
same-with some slight adjustments.
To examine the Barrett Builders holding in terms of the model
presented here, it will be helpful to first consider the economics of
the "traditional" statute of frauds and its exceptions. The statute of
frauds is one of the few areas of contract law that is explicit in its
attempt to deter opportunism. The statute's primary purpose is to
prevent plaintiff promisees from asserting false contractual claims
against defendant promisors.245 A writing, then, is just another
"safeguard" against opportunism: like arbitration, it can be viewed as
a kind of "specialized governance structure to which to refer and resolve disputes."246 But the absence of a writing does not always imply opportunism by the plaintiff promisee. Therefore, courts have
created exceptions to the statute for cases in which other evidence
suggests the plaintiff is not falsely asserting an agreement. These
exceptions include partial and full performance, restitution, and reli24 7

ance.

One way courts tend to show that the promisee is not opportunistic is to argue that it is actually the defendant promisor who is the
most-likely-opportunist. Courts, therefore, sometimes ground exceptions to the statute of frauds in the perceived opportunism of the
244. 513 A.2d 43 (Conn. 1986).
245. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 47, § 6.1, at 394.
246. ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 49, at 34. I can think of no other safeguards
against opportunism in private contracting that are mandatory, however.
247. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 47, at § 6.9, at 440-44, § 6.11, at 450-53, § 6.12, at
453-60.
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defendant promisor, though this idea is usually (unartfully) phrased as
"using the statute [of frauds] to accomplish a fraud."24 The "fraud"
accomplished by the defendant promisor via the statute of frauds is
not the typical ex ante variety of fraud,24 9 but rather stems from the
defendant's ex post desire to escape from promissory obligations that
have become costly. The defendant promisor seeking to use the statute of frauds defense acts opportunistically when the "real reason" for
the rupture of the deal is not a dispute over the existence or terms of
an agreement that have not been put in writing." If the reason for
the rupture of the deal lies elsewhere, the plaintiff promisee cannot be
acting opportunistically in asserting that an agreement existed, and
denying enforcement of this agreement based on the statute of frauds
would not serve its purpose of deterring promisee opportunism.25 '
Deterring opportunism is not the only purpose of the statute of
frauds, however. The statute of frauds also aims to deter negligent
behavior. Putting a contract in writing is often a relatively cheap
precaution against disputes, 251 whether the cause of the underlying

248. Michael Braunstein, Remedy, Reason, and the Statute of Frauds: A Critical Economic Analysis, 1989 UTAH L. REV. 383, 384-85 (brackets in original) (explaining one reason
courts have created exceptions to the statute is to prevent the statute from being used as a
shield for fraud and to prevent economic waste). The Barrett Builders dissent relies on this
rationale to argue in favor of recognizing an exception for restitution:
The statute of frauds was never intended to be used to permit one relying on it to
enrich himself at the expense of another or to aid in defrauding such other person.
To permit a party to an oral contract to accept the benefits of such contract and
then invoke the statute to avoid payment would be using the statute to perpetrate a
fraud.
Barrett Builders, 576 A.2d at 462 (Shea, J., dissenting) (quoting 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statute of
Frauds § 537 (1974)).
249. See 2 CORBIN, supra note 90, § 429, at 469-72 ("Such a result [using the statute of
frauds to avoid a contractual obligation], if permitted to exist, is indeed a horrid injustice, as
the community at large conceives of justice; but it is not the fraud of the statute of frauds,
or the fraud that is a tort." 2 id. § 429, at 471.). The baggage that apparently accompanies
the word "fraud" supports the use of the more generic term "opportunism" that I have argued
for here.
250. Cf. Barrett Builders, 576 A.2d at 463 (Shea, J., dissenting) (referring to "forfeitures
enriching the homeowners regardless of the merits of the disputes or the value of the work
performed").
251. Professor Braunstein's criticism of this rationale for exceptions to the statute of
frauds seems to miss the point. He argues that the statute of frauds is not designed to
prevent denial of a true agreement by the promisor, but only assertion of a false agreement
by the promisee. See Braunstein, supra note 248, at 404-05 & n.78. But allowing a promisor
to deny a true oral agreement would not further the purpose of the statute of frauds; it
would instead turn the statute into what laymen would call a "technicality" or "loophole."
252. 1 avoid the use of the now widely accepted term "evidentiary function" here. See
Lon F. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941); Joseph M. Perillo,
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dispute is opportunism by the plaintiff promisee or some other reason.253 By denying enforcement of oral agreements, the statute of
frauds encourages contracting parties to put their agreements in writing.25" But just as the absence of a writing does not necessarily indicate that the plaintiff promisee is opportunistic, neither does it necessarily indicate that she is the least-cost-avoider. First, it may be
relatively costly to create a writing for some transactions, because, for
example, time is at a premium. 5 Moreover, in some contexts, insisting on a writing may be a sign of lack of trust in the other
party's word, and could actually foment rather than prevent disputes.2 56 Second, the promisor might be the least-cost-avoider or at
least an equal-cost-avoider. Often either party could just as easily
have put the agreement into writing. If, however, the absence of a
writing does suggest that the plaintiff promisee is the least-cost-avoider, but it nevertheless appears that the defendant promisor is the
most-likely-opportunist, the. court faces the negligence-opportunism
tradeoff.
With this background in mind, we may now return to Barrett
Builders. The court could have made one of three possible choices:
declined to recognize a restitution exception in all cases regardless of
the facts; recognized a restitution exception and found that on the

The Statute of Frauds in the Light of the Functions and Dysfunctions of Form, 43 FORDHAM
L. REV. 39, 64-69 (1974). The evidentiary function could be applied to either opportunistic or
negligent behavior. I want to keep separate the deterrence of these two behaviors, however.
253. The underlying breach by the promisor need not be opportunistic. As Professor
Braunstein argues, however, strict enforcement of the statute of frauds will often lead to
inefficient breaches which may be opportunistic, and as I argued above, even "efficient"
breaches are sometimes opportunistic. My approach differs from Professor Braunstein's in that
he argues for the abolition of the statute of frauds to allow expectation damages to provide
the correct incentives for efficient breach, while I find the efficient breach theory inadequate.
Moreover, Professor Braunstein's efficient breach argument seems to ignore the administrative
cost savings the statute of frauds is supposed to bring about, and therefore sidesteps the
negligence-opportunism tradeoff that I fimd crucial to statute of frauds and other contract
cases. See Braunstein, supra note 248, at 395-403.
254. In the terminology of Ayres & Gertner, the statute of frauds operates as a "penalty
default." See generally Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2.
255. This may hold true for certain commercial transactions, such as last minute subcontractor bids. It does not hold true for the typical home improvement transaction. We might
therefore expect to see stricter enforcement of the statute of frauds in this area. Cf. THE
ECONOMICS OF LAW, supra note 144, at 64-65 (asserting that enforcement of the statute of
frauds may be stricter in real estate transactions because time is not usually of the essence).
256. See, e.g., Shepard v. Purvine, 248 P.2d 352, 362 (1952) (explaining that "to have
insisted upon a deed would have been embarrassing; in effect, it would have been expressing
a doubt as to their friend's integrity"). The existence of the statute of frauds, however, mitigates this social norm by making it acceptable to insist on a writing.
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facts of the case such an exception was not satisfied; or recognized
the exception and found that it was satisfied. The court chose the first
option. The theory presented here, by contrast, would advocate that a
restitution exception should be recognized, and that depending on the
facts of the case, the exception could be satisfied.
Recognizing contractor opportunism as the main evil the legislature sought to remedy through the Home Improvement Act statute of
frauds, Chief Justice Peters states that:
if recovery is permitted despite the fact that the underlying home
improvement contract is invalid, a contractor could unilaterally expand the scope of the project beyond the contemplation of the invalid agreement, without the homeowner's consent, and recover for the
unwanted work ....

The remedial purpose of [the statute] would

be placed in even greater jeopardy if a contractor could recover by
merely demonstrating that services had been rendered, without even
alleging that there was some sort of agreement for the work.ss
These assertions, which are unobjectionable, say nothing more than if
the contractor acts opportunistically by doing unwanted work and
thereby taking advantage of the homeowner, it should not recover.
The assertions also correctly imply that the legislature could make a
determination that contractor opportunism may occur frequently,,28
and could therefore establish a presumption that in the absence of a
writing, contractor opportunism has occurred. However, Chief Justice
Peters makes the presumption irrebuttable. What if the259facts suggest
that contractor opportunism did not cause the problem?

257. Barrett Builders, 576 A.2d at 459. This is not the first argument that the court
makes. Chief Justice Peters starts off by asserting that the case is governed by Caulkins
because there is no meaningful difference between an exception based on partial or full
performance and one based on restitution. See id at 457-58. Although the dissent takes issue
with this assertion, see id at 461 & n.1 (Shea, J., dissenting), it seems reasonable (at least
from an economic perspective), and so I will concentrate on the part of the opinion that, in
the alternative, reexamines Caulkins. In the interest of keeping the discussion to a manageable
length, I will also not discuss the doctrinal disagreement between the majority and the dissent
concerning the applicability of several lines of cases. Compare id at 458-59, with id at
462-63 (Shea, J., dissenting).
258. See id at 460 n.4 (taking judicial notice of a New York Times article reporting a
large number of consumer complaints against home improvement contractors).
259. Peters later asserts "that the objective of the Home Improvement Act is not only to
protect homeowners from substandard work, but also to ensure that homeowners are able to
make an informed choice on a decision that has potentially significant financial consequences.- Id at 460. The same argument applies here: the legislature may establish a statutory
presumption that a contractor who does not use a writing will unduly pressure or mislead the
homeowner at the outset. But the absence of a writing does not always indicate that such
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Peters implicitly recognizes the opportunism-negligence tradeoff
when she acknowledges that the court's "decision may lead to a harsh
result where a contractor in good faith but in ignorance of the law
performs valuable home improvements without complying with" the
statute.2 ° But she claims that "this deficiency in the statute [is not]
within our power to remedy."2 61 Peters's explanations of the court's
impotence, however, are unpersuasive. She makes three points that are
all accurate as far as they go, but irrelevant to the question of why
the opportunism-negligence tradeoff should be resolved in favor of the
homeowner in all cases.
Peters first states that "the legislature is entitled . . . to impose
the burden of compliance with the statute on the professional, the
26 2
contractor, rather than on the nonprofessional, the consumer."
This statement is significant and defensible: unlike the case with other
statutes of frauds, the absence of a writing in a home improvement
situation probably does mean that the contractor was the least-costavoider. The contractor, as the professional, repeat performer in the
market, is generally in a better position than the one-shot homeowner
to create a meaningful writing at lower cost.263 But this conclusion
has nothing to do with how to resolve the negligence-opportunism
tradeoff. The absence of a writing may mean that the contractor is at
least negligent, but if the contractor is no more than negligent, and
the homeowner is acting opportunistically, the statutory presumption
should yield.
Peters next concludes that "the legislature could legitimately view
contractor opportunism has occurred. In fact, a writing itself may be used to confuse homeowners and deprive them of an "informed choice." 3 CoRBIN, supra note 90, § 559, at 271
n.20; 6A i. § 1376, at 20-21; 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS
§ 4.26, at 478-90 (1990).
260. Barrett Builders, 576 A.2d at 460. Of course, the dissent states the danger more
forcefully:
The issue presently before us . . . is . . . whether a contractor who, out of ignorance or carelessness, has not reduced his oral agreement to writing or otherwise
has failed to conform to [the statute], must forfeit the entire value of the services
and materials he has furnished to a homeowner without any recompense.
Id. at 461 (Shea, J., dissenting).
261. Id. at 460.
262. Id.
263. Even this presumption is not always true. In A. Secondino & Son, Inc. v. LoRicco,
576 A.2d 464 (Conn. 1990), one of the companion cases to Barrett Builders, the dontractor
was "principally engaged in commercial work," including work for the defendant, "an experienced lawyer," who specifically requested the contractor to do work on his home. Id. at 466.
In that situation, the defendant was arguably the least-cost-avoider, as the dissent suggests.
See ia.at 469 (Shea, J., dissenting).
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as more urgent the need to protect consumers from unscrupulous
contractors than the need to protect innocent contractors. from manipulative consumers."' 64 Again this statement is sensible, but unsatisfactory. In enacting the Home Improvement Act statute of frauds, the
Connecticut legislature was obviously more concerned with protecting
innocent consumers than with protecting innocent contractors. And if
the court cannot tell the difference between an innocent contractor
and an unscrupulous contractor in a particular case-if, for example,
the dispute is simply a "shouting match" between the contractor and
the homeowner over the existence or terms of the agreement, with no
other evidence to back up either side's position-then erring on the
side of punishing the contractor is a reasonable means of carrying out
the legislature's intent. The court could also establish a heightened
burden of proof for the contractor to meet in overcoming the presumption. But if in some cases the facts (other than testimony of the
parties) strongly imply that the contractor is "innocent" and the homeowner "manipulative," it would do no harm to legislative intent to
hold the consumers to their bargain.
Finally, Peters asks, "What benefit.., has a homeowner received by getting unwanted goods and services? Judicial assessment
of such a 'benefit' would necessarily be so speculative as to undermine the objectives that the statute sought to achieve."26 5 The question purports to raise an administrative cost limitation based on measurement difficulties, but falls short of supporting the court's resolution of the negligence-opportunism tradeoff. Restitution damages
should not be awarded at all for "unwanted goods and services." 2"
But that is not the relevant issue. The more relevant question is
whether courts can ever cheaply assess whether the goods and services were in fact wanted, and if they were, what value to place on
them. These are the cases in which the court's choice matters.
But the court never squarely faces the question of whether judges can ever tell the difference between an incompetent contractor and
an unscrupulous one, or between an innocent homeowner and a manipulative one, with sufficient certainty to make feasible an exception
to the legislative presumption of contractor opportunism. The compan-

264. Barrett Builders, 576 A.2d at 460.
265. Id at 461.
266. Cf.FARNSWORTH, supra note 47, § 6.11, at 451-52 ("There is . . .no recovery for
reliance by the injured party that was not bargained for or requested and that has conferred
no benefit whatsoever.").
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ion cases to Barrett Builders suggest, however, that the answer to this
26
question is that they can.2" In Liljedahl Brothers v. Grigsby,1
the homeowner did not answer the contractor's complaint, nor did he
allege any dissatisfaction with the contractor's performance; rather, he
simply filed a motion to strike based on the absence of a writing.2"
In Sidney v. DeVries270 and A. Secondino, Inc. v. LoRicco,7 1 the
homeowners raised claims based on dissatisfaction with the
contractors' work, but the respective trial courts found these claims to
be without merit. In each of these cases, the Connecticut Supreme
Court applied Barrett Builders to bar any recovery by the contractor
without any additional analysis or explanation. 2' But if-as at least
the Sidney and A. Secondino cases seem to demonstrate-contractors
are not always opportunistic, homeowners may be, and courts can
often tell the difference fairly easily, so there seems to be no reason
to "furnish homeowners ... with a virtual license to steal by invoking [the] statute after substantial work has been performed without a
proper written' contract." 273
The court could have responded that despite the fact that courts
should generally give higher priority to deterring opportunism than to
deterring negligence, in the home improvement context, deterring
contractor negligence is likely to be highly effective due to the fact
that contractors are repeat players in the market and are likely to
learn very quickly of the court's strict approach-perhaps through
their lawyers or trade associations-and clean up their acts. The court
does not explicitly take this route, though its reference to the Home
Improvement Act as a "consumer protection statute" suggests it. In
any event, this route does not seem to be a promising one, because,
as the dissent points out:

267. Courts' experience with restitutionary relief under the traditional statute of frauds, as
well as in other areas of contract law, also supports this conclusion. See, e.g., A. Secondino,
Inc., 576 A.2d at 464; Liljedahl Bros. v. Grigsby, 576 A.2d 149 (Conn. 1990); Sidney v.
DeVries, 575 A.2d 228 (Conn. 1990).
268. 576 A.2d at 149.
269. See id. Under the traditional statute of frauds, most courts still allow a party to
admit the making of the contract and yet use the statute to insist on its unenforceability,
though U.C.C. § 2-201 (1990), and some jurisdictions have abandoned this rule. See generally
FARNSWORTH, supra note 47, § 6.10, at 446-47. In my view, the U.C.C. rule is better
because it recognizes the danger of promisor opportunism.
270. 575 A.2d at 228-29.
271. 576 A.2d at 466-67 & nn.3-4.
272. A. Secondino, 576 A.2d at 467; Sidney, 575 A.2d at 229.
273. Barrett Builders, 576 A.2d at 464 (Shea, J., dissenting).
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The term "contractor" suggests an image of affluence or economic
status that is wholly unrealistic when applied to carpenters, plumbers, electricians, landscapers and other tradesmen involved in making
home improvements within the definition of [the Home Improvement Act]. Many of these self-employed workers lack the education
necessary to 'be aware of the potential impact of [the statute of
frauds provision] on their occupations and are unable to afford the
expense of obtaining the assistance of counsel, which may be dis-

proportionate to the amounts of the small contracts that provide
their livelihood.274
In fact, Sidney involved a self-employed contractor.275 The problem
with the court's justification is that it wrongly assumes that "contractor" and "homeowner" are sufficiently homogenous classes that strict
deterrence is likely to be effective. 276 If "contractor" and "homeowner" are overly broad categories, however, then oral home improvement contracts will continue to exist. Under these circumstances,
giving priority to deterring negligence will have the unfortunate effects of punishing trusting, incompetent contractors and rewarding
deceitful homeowners. Thus, neither the court's express nor implied
justifications for its strict rule are sufficient to override the general
presumption advocated here that in cases in which the negligenceopportunism tradeoff is present, courts should opt for deterring opportunism.
The Barrett Builders "rule" may not be as harsh as it first
seems, however. Chief Justice Peters does leave an escape hatch for
"innocent" contractors similar to the one left by Professor Schwartz
with respect to "supracompensatory" contract remedies. Peters declares
near the end of the opinion that a homeowner who acts in "bad faith"
may not take advantage of the statute of frauds defense.' Aside
274. Id.
275. See Sidney, 575 A.2d at 229.
276. In Calabresi's terms, the question is whether the world has been sufficiently
"subeategorized" into contractors and homeowners. See COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 8,
at 246-49.
277. See Barrett Builders, 576 A.2d at 460 (holding that "[a]s a minimum, the import of
§ 20-429 is that the defendant was privileged, in the absence of an allegations of bad faith,
to repudiate an agreement in violation of the statute"); see also A. Secondino, 576 A.2d at
467 (court followed the holding in Barrett Builders that a contractor may not recover when
he has "failed to comply with the statute's written contract requirement"); Liljedahl Bros.,
576 A.2d at 152 (court noted that the issue had been fully discussed in Barrett Builders and
that they would not change their holding in that case barring recovery absent a showing of
bad faith); Sidney, 576 A.2d at 229 (court followed the holding in Barrett Builders in
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from assuring that every complaint by a contractor against a homeowner will now contain an allegation of homeowner bad faith, it is
not yet clear what effect this escape hatch will have. Nevertheless,
there are indications that the court intends the hole to be very small:
only blatant, not subtle, opportunism by homeowners will probably be
held to meet the exception. One indication of a likely narrow interpretation of "bad faith" is that the court did not even hint that the
"bad faith" exception might be applicable in any of the companion
cases, despite the fact that in none of these cases was any plausible
breach by the contractor alleged. If it is not "bad faith" for a homeowner without a legitimate gripe against a contractor to use the statute of frauds to withhold payment and yet keep the benefits of the
contractor's performance, one can only imagine the kind of conduct
that a homeowner would have to engage in before a contractor could
avail itself of this exception.278
The other indication that the court intends to interpret homeowner bad faith narrowly is a quite remarkable footnote near the end of
the opinion, which is worth quoting in its entirety:
A question remains concerning the ability of a homeowner to
recover a down payment or progress payments made during the
performance of home improvements but prior to the discovery of
the invalidity of the contract. It is not clear whether a homeowner
who has received materials and services and has made payments in
recognition of that benefit can recover those payments. Arguably, a
homeowner who has made such progress payments has impliedly
consented to the work performed. The issue raised by a suit to
recover partial payments differs substantially from that raised by
refusal to pay sums alleged to be due on an invalid contract. We
need not resolve that thorny issue today.279

holding that a contractor is barred from recovering damages when the contract was oral,
unless he can prove bad faith on the part of the homeowner).
278. This is not the irst time Chief Justice Peters has crafted an unduly narrow exception for opportunistic behavior. In Mozzochi v. Beck, 529 A.2d 171 (1987) (Peters, CJ.), the
court held that lawyers could not be held liable for abuse of process to their client's opponent in other litigation, despite the fact that the lawyers knew the allegations in the other

litigation were false and without merit. The court restricted third party recovery against
lawyers for abuse of process to cases in which the third party can point to "specific misconduct intended to cause specific injury outside of the normal contemplation of private
litigation." Id. at 174 (emphasis added). Evidently, lawyers filing factually baseless claims is
within the normal contemplation of private litigation. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. &
SUSAN P. KONIAK, THE LAW AND ETHIcs OF LAWYERING, 425-26 (1990).
279. Barrett Builders, 576 A.2d at 460 n.5.
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Once again, Peters' argument contains a kernel of truth: if a contractor opportunistically substitutes inferior products and the homeowner
does not discover this fact until after making a progress payment, the
homeowner should be allowed to recover the progress payment to
deter contractor opportunism.
But the footnote goes far beyond this position. First, the court's
point of reference is not when the homeowner discovers the
contractor's breach, but when the homeowner discovers the contract's
invalidity. This seems to mean merely the fact that no sufficient writing exists to make the contract enforceable. This moment is exactly
the moment when homeowner opportunism is most likely. Second, the
court declines to state forcefully that a homeowner generally should
not get back a progress payment because such a payment tends to
suggest satisfaction with the work and therefore the lack of contractor
opportunism. The court says rather that "arguably" the homeowner
has "impliedly consented" and that the issue is a "thorny" one. Such
a muted commitment to deterring homeowner opportunism may very
well encourage such behavior. One can easily see the development,
for example, of lawyer advertising that would make opponents of
such activity cringe: "Are you less than 100% satisfied with your
home improvement contract, for any reason? Do not pay another cent!
Call us now! You may be entitled not only to withhold further payment but to a refund of any payments you have already made!" What
would make such advertising troubling is the fact that it focuses the
homeowner's attention not on the wrongful behavior of the contractor,
but on the homeowner's (and lawyer's) possibly large recovery. The
point is that the court makes homeowner opportunism more likely by
making it more tempting.
Even if the Connecticut courts interpret homeowner bad faith
narrowly when there is no writing at all, what of those cases like
Barrett Builders in which there is a writing but the terms are not
clear? The Home Improvement Act statute of frauds requires that the
writing "contain[] the entire agreement .. . .280 Because courts
must interpret the "entire" agreement (whether or not they are "competent" to do so), they have another vehicle through which to express
concern with homeowner opportunism.
In Barrett Builders, the court held that the writing was insufficient because it mentioned only cabinets without specifying the type,

280.

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20429(a)(3) (West 1992).
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" ' But there must be some limit to the requirement
style, or brand.28
that the writing contain the "entire" agreement; this limit is determined at least in part by homeowner opportunism.28 2 To go back to
the Jacob & Youngs scenario for a moment, suppose a writing specified "wrought iron pipe" but not the brand name. Would the Connecticut Supreme Court hold that the writing contains the "entire" agreement if the contractor used Cohoes pipe, but the homeowner insists
she wanted Reading pipe? If not, then almost any alleged disagreement over terms-no matter how trivial or implausible-could give
rise to a statute of frauds defense.
However, the court eventually comes out on this issue, its holding on the known facts of Barrett Builders is reasonably defensible.
There was no evidence to support the dissent's conjecture that the
contractor in this case failed to conform to the statute's requirements
out of "ignorance or carelessness. 28 3 It is also more plausible that
the homeowner would care what kind of cabinet she got than it was
that the homeowner in Jacob & Youngs cared what brand of pipe he
got. In addition, the facts are consistent with the story that the contractor acted opportunistically ex ante: he might have misled the
homeowner by showing her a fancier cabinet than the one he intended to supply and leaving the specifications deliberately vague. Thus,
denying enforcement of this agreement would arguably further the
purposes of the statute of frauds.
Nevertheless, the court seems to have cut off the inquiry too
fast. The contractor might have been merely negligent and the dispute
might have been a simple misunderstanding that the contractor was
willing to fix. The less likely contractor opportunism is, the more
likely the reason for the dispute is homeowner opportunism. One
extra fact the court might look at is the price term. If the quoted
price was the contractor's (or the industry's) usual price for "solid

281. See Barrett Builders, 576 A.2d at 459-60.
282. A similar problem exists under the "traditional" statute of frauds, which requires that
the writing state the "essential terns" of the agreement. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 47,
§ 6.7, at 430-31. Interestingly, in interpreting this requirement, the Connecticut Supreme
Court-in an opinion by then-Justice Peters-held that it was error to disallow a memorandum that referred to the "usual provisions found in . . . purchase money mortgage deeds"
where "the parties' disputes about performance relate to matters entirely independent of the
purchase money mortgage." Lynch v. Davis, 435 A.2d 977, 980 (1980) (Peters, J.), cited with
approval in FARNSWORTH, supra note 47, § 6.7, at 431 n.34. In Lynch, the court recognized
what it overlooked in Barrett Builders, namely that the reason for the breach always matters,
because the party seeking to use the statute of frauds may be acting opportunistically.
283. Barrett Builders, 576 A.2d at 461 (Shea, J., dissenting).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol20/iss4/4

72

Cohen: The Negligence-Opportunism Tradeoff in Contract Law
1992]

NEGLIGENCE-OPPORTUNISMTRADEOFF

core" cabinets, and if the contractor substituted "hollow core" cabinets
(and if hollow core cabinets are cheaper), that would tend to support
the court's decision. On the other hand, if the contractor could show
that it charged a lower, "hollow core" price, the inference of contractor opportunism is weaker and the argument for allowing restitution-at least for the work performed other than the installation of the
cabinets (assuming it was satisfactory)-is stronger.2"
There may be no "optimal" restitution exception to the statute of
frauds; the limits and presumptions of such an exception could reasonably be crafted in different ways. And there may be better solutions to the negligence-opportunism tradeoff in the statute of frauds
than allowing a plaintiff-promisee to recover in restitution. One possibility recognized by Chief Justice Peters is for the legislature to reduce the penalty for noncompliance with the statute to a fixed fine or
percentage reduction in the payment." 5 Such a solution has the advantage of encouraging contractors to put agreements in writing, but
not creating a tempting pot of gold that could encourage homeowner
opportunism. 8 6 The point I have tried to make here is that the
Barrett Builders holding is based on the faulty premise that in analyzing the scope of the statute of frauds, a court can ignore the reason
the contract soured and can isolate one incident-the absence of a
writing-and create a rule determined by that fact alone. Such a rule
does not further the purposes of the statute of frauds; it is neither
efficient nor just. It is a delusion fostered in part by approaches to
contract law-whether traditional or economic-that fail to recognize
and resolve the negligence-opportunism tradeoff.
CONCLUSION
I would like to close by responding to what I take to be the
main point-although certainly not the point on which most readers
284. Under the "traditional" statute of frauds, the general rule seems to be that "ifone
promise is within the statute, the entire contract is within the statute, and no part of the contract is enforceable unless the statute is satisfied." FARNSWoRTH, supra note 47, § 6.10, at
448-49. One way the Connecticut courts could mitigate the strict rule of Barrett Builders is
to relax the "traditional" rule regarding divisibility.
285. See Barrett Builders, 576 A.2d at 461.
286. A similar solution has been tried, and has met with significant success in the "plain
writing" movement. New York's plain language law imposes a flat, relatively small fine, plus
actual damages for violations. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-702 (MeKinney 1989). This has
evidently had the effect beth of deterring convoluted legal documents and discouraging
opportunistic litigation. See, e.g., Carl Felsenfeld, The Future of Plain English, 62 MiCH. BJ.
942 (1983).
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287 Despite the
focus-of Grant Gilmore's The Death of Contract.
book's title, Gilmore's broad theme is that general theories of law do
more harm than' they do good.288 In creating and perpetuating the
general theory of contract, Langdell, Holmes, and Williston were not
merely wrong in choosing their particular theory. They were wrong,
according to Gilmore, to create a theory at all, to think that one
could ever set down general and immutable principles that cut across
legal boundaries and hold true for all time. 289 To demonstrate this
proposition, Gilmore presents a series of case analyses that effectively
make the theorists' views of these cases seem ridiculous. He does this
by pointing out additional facts neglected by the theorists or by asking crucial questions that the theorists never considered.
Professor Wonnell has recently argued that "many of Gilmore's
criticisms concern not the principle of abstraction itself, but the specific abstractions chosen."' "' Gilmore never tells us why he asks the
particular probing questions he does or why he focuses on the specific
facts he does. I do not mean to suggest that Gilmore asks bad questions or focuses on the wrong facts. On the contrary, Gilmore was a
great legal mind precisely because he asked the right questions. But
what makes these questions right, these facts relevant? Only a theory,
grounded to some extent in abstraction can tell us. In the words of
Professor Wonnell, "principles of contract universally applied will
direct people's attention to the relevant facts, lead to the discovery of
those facts, and motivate action based on those discoveries., 29 1 In

287. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).
288. Professor Hillman has recently responded to the flood of contract theories that have
recently emerged with Gilmorian skepticism. He argues that "modem contract law" effectively
takes into account both "the principle of freedom of contract" and "fairness and the interdependence of parties," yet "modem contract scholars devote much of their writings to the
essentially unanswerable and perhaps even unimportant question of the relative weight of
these sometimes conflicting principles." Robert A. Hillman, The Crisis in Modern Contract
Theory, 67 TEX. L. REV. 103, 104 (1988) (emphasis added). In my view, the resolution of
the negligence-opportunism tradeoff is truly significant: it defines who we are and what we
value. Moreover, I have taken the position here that itis a tradeoff about which we can say
something meaningful.
289. See GILiORE, supra note 287, at 97-98 ("The basic idea of the Langdellian revolution seems to have been that there really is such a thing as the one true rule of law, universal and unchanging, always and everywhere the same-a sort of mythical absolute. To all of
us, I dare say, the idea seems absurd.").
290. Christopher T. Wonnell, The Abstract Character of Contract Law, 22 CONN. L.
REV. 437, 444 (1990).
291. Id at 450. Wonnell argues that the crucial abstractions for contract law are abstractions of person and subject matter. Id at 438. I disagree. I would prefer to construct abstractions of reasons for contracting and reasons for breaching. For example, in my view, the
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my view, what Gilmore's critique successfully demonstrates is that
abstractions that ignore the purpose of contracting and the reasons for
nonperformance are harmful. These matter because they focus our
attention on the kinds of contractual behavior we want to encourage
and discourage so as to improve future contracting. The abstractions
we should be focusing on, therefore, are abstractions based on presumptions of opportunistic and negligent behavior that we seek to
deter through contract law.2"
Gilmore might have responded that this redirected abstraction-this new classicism-is also doomed to failure because there
will always be new questions and new social conditions to which the
theory is not addressed.293 But that suggests only that theories must
be open-ended and constantly evolving, not that they are more harmful than useful. Gilmore might even have agreed with this view of
theory: after all, he probably had some implicit analytical structure in
mind in focusing on the questions he did. The problem is in transmitting the technique-both its possibilities and limitations-to mere
mortals.
Consider the bridge player. She learns to play bridge by mastering a point-count system of bidding and standard moves such as
finesses. Now the point-count system, if followed strictly, often yields
wrong or misleading results. The great bridge players are the ones
who know when to deviate from the guidelines. Some may even skip
the point-count system entirely and jump right to a complex analysis
of the hand.
So it is with lawyers and legal theories. Law and Economics
provides a kind of point-count system of guidelines and generalizations that may well yield incorrect answers in particular cases. It may
also be true that some will be better off not having guidelines at all
for this reason. But I believe that it is also true that without some

category "contracts breached to take advantage of a market price change" is a more useful
abstraction than "construction contracts."
292. I would make the same response to Farnsworth's recent disparagement of contract
theory: "The urge to have a 'theory' of contract law has tended to increase the distance
between contracts scholarship and practice. In particular, it has led to an excessive emphasis
by scholars on why promises are enforced." E. Allan Farnsworth, A Fable and a Quiz on
Contracts, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 206, 208 (1987). I certainly agree that contract theories should
not be focusing on why promises are enforced. But the fact that they do is a fault of the
theories, not of theorizing.
293. See GILMORE, supra note 279, at 7-8 (describing the "general law of contract" as a
"theoretical construct which, having little or nothing to do with the real world, would not-or
could not-change as the real world changed").
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guidance, many more people-with far less insight than
Gilmore-will commit far worse errors. Law and Economics, when
practiced well, offers useful guidelines while explicitly recognizing the
empirical assumptions and theoretical basis of these guidelines.
This paper has tried to improve the Law and Economics approach to contracts by recasting the two analytic traditions of the
economic analysis of contract in terms of deterring negligent and
opportunistic behavior: by combining the traditions into a more general, fault-based theory; by recognizing the necessity for resolving the
negligence-opportunism tradeoff; and by advocating that greater priority should be given to using contract doctrine to deter opportunistic
contracting behavior. My hope is that the economic approach to contract law will be improved as a result, and that lawyers, judges, and
scholars may find the expanded theory to be a useful guideline for
analyzing the cases they are dealt.
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